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REMARKS

ON THE MOST IMPORTANT

MILITARY OPERATIONS

OF THE

ENGLISH FORCES,

ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF THE

PENINSULA OF HINDOOSTAN;

IN 1783, AND 1784,

IN WHICH,

The Conduct of the ARMY under the Command of BRIGADIER GENERAL MATHEWS, is VINDICATED, from the illiberal Misrepresentations, contained in a late NARRATIVE, Signed JOHN CHARLES SHEEN, and published by Order of the COURT of DIRECTORS of the EAST INDIA COMPANY.

IN A SERIES OF LETTERS

TO A

FRIEND IN ENGLAND.

TO WHICH ARE ANNEXED

TWO ORIGINAL LETTERS,

FROM GEN. MATHEWS TO LORD MACARTNEY, AND SIR EYRE COOTE.

BY A BRITISH OFFICER.

Virtus repulsæ nescia sordidæ
Intaminatis fulget honoribus.

HOR.

[Moodie, John

LONDON:
PRINTED at the Logographic Press,
FOR MESSRS. ROBSON AND CLARKE, NEW BOND-STREET,
AND J. SEWELL, CORNHILL.
M,DCC,LXXXVIII.

TO

THE OFFICERS

IN THE

SERVICE OF THE KING,

AND OF

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY,

EMPLOYED DURING THE LATE WAR ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF INDIA.

GENTLEMEN,

I PRESUME to dedicate the following pages to you, as the only tribute of gratitude, which I can at present offer, in return for that protection by which you condescended to distinguish me, while I had the honour, during the most active part of my life, to share your toils, and to be an eye witness of your services.

To

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To vindicate your conduct, which malignancy has endeavoured to misrepresent, or rather to excite some abler pen to do you justice, is the design of the following remarks.

On the public mind, the first impression is too often the strongest, and the most lasting. It is, therefore, necessary to do away that impression, before it shall sink too deep; and to convince every person who has been prejudiced against you, that it is in a great measure owing to your spirited exertions, that the Affairs of the Company were preserved from Ruin on the Western side of India, and the Blessings of Peace at length restored throughout Hindoostan.

That the Public may view your conduct in its proper light, and that you

may

may long continue able to aſſert the cauſe of your Country, and remain laſting ornaments to the military character, which you have hitherto ſupported with ſo much honour to yourſelves, and advantage to the Britiſh Empire, will, I flatter myſelf, be as much the ſincere wiſh of every friend to his King and Country, as it is of,

Gentlemen,

your moſt faithful

and obedient ſervant.

J. M.

LONDON,
May, 1788.

CORRECTIONS AND *ERRATA.*

Page.	Line.	
2	18	for *has* read *have.*
16	15	for *and were liberated,* read *who were liberated*
28	2	dele *but*
31	1	dele *not*
	12	dele *from them*
32	5	dele *I*
47	23	for *may* refute, read *can* refute
48	8	for *regard the fate of Gen. Mathews,* read *regard Gen. Mathews.*
85	18	dele *in.*

REMARKS, &c.

LETTER I.

Bombay, May, 1786.

SIR,

A Serious and attentive perufal of fome late publications in Europe, relative to the operations of the army under the command of *Brigadier General Mathews,* on the weftern fide of India, has excited my aftonifhment in a very great degree. And that fuch exaggerated accounts, fuch palpable falfities, as thefe publications contain, fhould be fuffered to pafs uncontradicted, appears to me ftill more furprifing.

 You

You have frequently heard me ſay, that we had many officers among us, who, were not only men of honour, but of true courage, and of ſignal military talents; and were alike eſteemed for their good ſenſe, their taſte, and their love of literature. That their ſenſe of honour could, in any one ſingle inſtance, be more materially injured, or their talents have a better opportunity for diſplay, than on this ſubject, with a well informed and unprejudiced public, I think can hardly ever be diſputed.

I feel, with no ſmall concern, that a taſk of defending the conduct of brother officers and ſoldiers on ſuch an occaſion,—a taſk which might come far better from a different quarter,—ſhould be reſerved for me, who has ſo little to boaſt of in reſpect to literary advantages. But as I love my native country, I ſhall ever be perſuaded, that though the inherent generoſity which has always characteriſed Britons, and renders them incapable of ſuſpicion and diſtruſt, may now and then be made ſubſervient to the purpoſes of artful and deſigning men; yet their

their love of juſtice, their love of truth, predominating, they will as frequently come to a minute examination of charges, regardleſs of the ſeeming plauſibility, or the varniſh with which they may be embelliſhed,*and be thankful for any materials that may ſerve to elucidate their enquiries, under whatever diſadvantages they may be procured.

I am ſure my countrymen, on reflection, will be ſenſible of the abſurdity of being too haſty in their determinations ;— when deciſions are too precipitately drawn, they are apt to bend under the weight of a juſt and well formed ſuperſtructure. If the eye and the ear were the mere adjuncts of the mind of man, and were not ſubject to be corrected by the underſtanding, how nearly ſhould we border on brutality. If we do not, therefore, ſuſpend our judgment for awhile, the coloured canvaſs will ſeem to poſſeſs more charms than nature herſelf, and the ſuperficial glare of tinſel, be far more

* The productions of Meſſrs. Oakes and Sheen are not here meant.

inviting than the luſtre of the moſt precious rubies.

Encouraged from theſe conſiderations, I ſhall proceed to give you in the courſe of our correſpondence, a faithful and particular detail of the moſt intereſting part of the military operations, on the weſtern ſide of India, during the years 1783, and 1784: and this I entreat you, to communicate to as many of your friends as you can; that it may appear to the world, with what little reaſon the army has been ſo ſhamefully ſtigmatized.

It will be unneceſſary for me to obſerve to you, that my ſituation with the army, during the whole period of its ſervice on that ſide of the Peninſula, was ſuch as afforded me the ampleſt opportunities of information.

My intention of writing theſe letters, is not to exculpate General Mathews from imputed guilt, but to clear his officers and ſoldiers from the imputations with which they have been indiſcriminately aſperſed,

as

as if it were not poſſible for them to be otherwiſe than guilty under him.—Admitting him, therefore, in all reſpects to be as culpable as repreſented,—guilty of cruelties and peculation, — it muſt be unjuſt to make it a neceſſary conſequence that the officers of the army, under his command, were equally criminal: for in direct contradiction of all the malicious repreſentations to their prejudice in the public prints, I can in conſcience, poſitively declare, that there never was an army in any quarter of the globe, leſs inclined to acts of cruelty and oppreſſion; nor one which had exhibited ſtronger proofs of unwearied zeal, honour and humanity, than that employed on the weſtern ſide of India, during the late war.

The only inſtance in which their conduct appeared in any wiſe reprehenſible, was their ſupineneſs in having ſuffered thoſe injurious falſehoods, ſo much to their diſadvantage, to be diſſeminated by unfriendly minds in England; when by a proper reply, they had every advantage which truth could afford for ample juſtifi-

 cation;

cation ; and the public, which ultimately decides with impartiality, muſt have done them juſtice.

I have now, therefore, on their behalf and my own, taken upon me to anſwer for the army under General Mathews, and will proceed with calmneſs and candour ; and I hope to refute thoſe miſrepreſentations, ſo far as they concern us, and ſlightly to mention ſuch other intereſting particulars relative to the operations of that army, as my reſidence in India has enabled me to notice.

The narrative of *Captain Oakes*, wherein he ſpeaks of the treatment experienced by the Engliſh priſoners, comes firſt under my animadverſion. This narrative appears to have been publiſhed by *order of the Court of Directors of the Eaſt-India Company*; and in the appendix it is obſerved, " That the barba-" rities exerciſed by Tippoo Saheb on " General Mathews and his captive army, " were evidently in *retaliation*, for ſundry " enormities committed by the troops of " the Company." And, in confirmation of this aſſertion, he gives us, added to his

own remarks, a relation by Lieutenant Sheen, written to his father in London, dated at Madras, 2d of May, 1784, in matter and ſtyle of a ſimilar nature.

Recently, and by accident, I ſaw this ſtriking ſpecimen of arrogance and abſurdity, which found its way to the public; I peruſed it with the feelings of a man, and the ſenſibility of a ſoldier, touched and injured in the niceſt points—his humanity and his honour; and as ſoon as the heat of a juſt and natural indignation had given way to the cool dictates of reaſon, I determined to employ my future profeſſional avocations, in becoming the voluntary advocate of my much injured brother officers and ſoldiers.

Before I enter on a detail of facts, it is neceſſary to make a few remarks upon the ſituation of thoſe who hold places of eminent truſt in the Company's ſervice in India, particularly the military eſtabliſhment, which is an object requiring the moſt vigilant and minute inſpection, and an unremitting and vigorous ſuperintendance, or, from the diſtance of the ſuperior government in England, confuſion and total loſs

of territory would be the immediate confe-quence. For this reafon, founded in necef-fity, thofe officers, who are intrufted with the execution of the Company's orders, whe-ther civil or military, are often authorifed to exercife a difcretionary power in cafes of emergency. Now thefe officers being fu-perior to controul, and free from refponfi-bility, too often yield to thofe temptations of accumulating wealth, which opportunity prefents,—which avarice and impunity urge. The truftee of courfe will, fometimes, ufe that commiffion and authority repofed in him, for the general good of the Company, as a means of promoting the private fortune of the individual, to the fubverfion of pub-lic juftice, and to the difgrace of private principle.

But though fuch betrayers of public truft, fhould be rendered amenable to punifh-ment while living, and their names ftigma-tized with ignominy when dead, yet difcri-mination fhould attend the fentence, and the innocent be preferved from fuffering with the guilty. Thofe who with courage and honour have reaped the laurel in the field, fhould not be prevented from enjoying their fair

fair fame, under the ſhade of the domeſtic olive.

Captain Oakes in his Narrative, has exhibited a charge of enormities againſt the officers who ſerved under General Mathews; and though he does not venture to particularize either the perſons offending, or the offences committed: he raſhly concludes, "That the misfortunes, which befell the "ſurvivors, were a juſt puniſhment for "their crimes, and that Tippoo Saheb's "cruelty was, in ſome reſpects, rather a "matter of *retaliation*, than of natural or "habitual inhumanity inherent to his temper."—Whatever may have been the motives of Tippoo Saheb—whatever cruelties he inflicted upon thoſe brave men who became his captives by the fortune of war, thoſe motives could not have been more unjuſt—thoſe cruelties could not have been more inhuman, than this unſupported charge upon the character of the whole army.

But the enemies of that army, not content with the charge of rapine, have likewiſe

wife accused them of committing murder,—even the murder of innocent women and children.* This account is said to be that of an officer, who was present at the massacre at Annantpore, in the province of Bidnure; where, he affirms that he saw *upwards of four hundred beautiful women, expiring under the wounds of the Sepoys bayonets*; and the progress of this army has been generally compared to that of Cortez in Mexico, or Pizarro in Peru.

I shall speak minutely on this particular in its proper place: but does it appear from any authority, respectable for veracity, that the English, on their march through Tippoo Sultan's dominions commited any wanton outrage? Does it appear, that villages were set on fire, the inhabitants carried into captivity, or that crops of corn ready for the sickle, were destroyed? In short, can it be proved, that the natives were injured in the least degree, either in their persons or property? On the contrary,

* Dodsley's Annual Register, for 1783, page 91.

the truth is, that Hyder's army, and afterwards that of his ſon and ſucceſſor Tippoo Sultan, was guilty of the moſt ſhocking barbarities, ſuch as putting to death, and inflicting amputation of limbs, without regard to age or ſex, whether armed againſt him or not, and of laying waſte every part of the country.

As it makes no part of my deſign to form details of ſuch barbarous tranſactions, I ſhall touch only for the preſent on the manifeſt abſurdities contained in the pamphlets of Meſſieurs Oakes and Sheen. Theſe I conceive to be the ground work of the fabricated accounts concerning the Bidnure campaign, in Dodſley's Annual Regiſter, and ſome other European periodical publications. In the Monthly Review for May, 1785, *it is remarked, "That ſome provocation, no "doubt, had been given by the Britiſh army "to that of the adverſary; for that Lieu- "tenant Sheen in his Narrative, ſubjoin- "ed to that of Captain Oakes, ſays, that the "conduct of Tippoo Saheb was founded on

* Page 379. Art. 17.

" principles of *retaliation*; and candour " must acknowledge, that the unjustifiable " behaviour of the Company's army went " a considerable way in justification of that " of the enemy."

Again, in a paragraph in Dodsley's Annual Register of the year above specified, it is observed, " That as slaughter, cruelty, " rapine, and avarice, had disgraced this " expedition in its commencement at " Onore, so the same detestable maxims " and vices continued to stain its whole " progress, till these were, at its fatal con- " clusion, most cruelly requited, when the " innocent, indiscriminately with the guil- " ty, became victims to the rage of an ex- " asperated and merciless enemy." By merely comparing these extracts, it may easily be perceived from what source they originated.

I would by no means take upon me the vindication of General Mathews in every particular point through which his conduct might be viewed, except only in that where tyranny and oppression are laid to his charge:

neither ſhall I endeavour to make appear, that in theſe charges the General is perfectly juſtifiable, by adducing ſuch circumſtantial evidence, as ſhould put the matter beyond all doubt.

Whatever degree of credit theſe illiberal aſperſions may have gained with the uninformed part of mankind, it is certain no general and impartial hiſtory of the military operations of the Britiſh forces in Hindooſtan, has been publiſhed under the ſanction of any reſpectable authority, though the ſubject itſelf is of the higheſt magnitude, and deſerves to be recorded in the moſt circumſtantial manner, as nothing can be of greater importance to the character of the Britiſh nation in that part of the world. There is indeed an extract of a letter,* relative to the military operations on that ſide of India, from the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, to the Select Committee of the Court of Directors of the Eaſt-India Company, and this is the only account, which may be depended on. And it is there acknowledged, that a want of

* Dated June 27, 1783.

infor-

information from General Mathews, had put them under the neceffity of applying to Colonel Mac Leod for furnifhing them with a detail of the operations of the army, from its leaving Cundapore till the furrender of Bidnure, together with any intelligence he could give them refpecting the treaty with Hyat Saheb, and the Proceedings confequent to it.

I have the honor to be,

with the moft perfect refpect,

Sir,

Your moft faithful and obliged

humble Servant.

LET-

LETTER II.

Calcutta, October, 1786.

SIR,

THE firſt charge brought againſt the army, in the earlier period of the campaign, is by the compiler of Dodſley's Annual Regiſter, (for 1783, page 88), where he ſpeaks thus: " But before the arrival of " the ſouthern troops, Onore was taken by " ſtorm, and a cruel ſlaughter is ſaid to " have been made of the inhabitants of all " ſexes, ages, and orders, as well as of the " garriſon. The official accounts ſtate, " that the Killedar, or governor, with " twelve hundred men, were made pri- " ſoners."

In direct contradiction to the falſehood of this repreſentation, I ſhall obſerve in as conciſe a manner as poſſible, that the aſſault of Onore happened on the 5th of January, 1783, about noon, and at a time when the enemy

enemy had juſt formed a diſpoſition for a ſally into our camp; as was evident from the number that appeared on the out-works and in the covert-ways. This, as imagined, was a circumſtance which rendered an attack on the place leſs difficult than it otherwiſe muſt have been. In regard to the cruelty, ſaid to have been exerciſed on the beſieged, nothing can be more groundleſs than this aſſertion; for on the contrary, the enemy were treated with the utmoſt tenderneſs and humanity.

The number of priſoners, taken on the ſurrender of Onore, were not twelve hundred, but two thouſand eight hundred, and were liberated immediately after they were captured; the aſſertions therefore of thoſe who have traduced the characters of the army under General Mathews, muſt, from that circumſtance, loſe all authority, and convict of falſehood thoſe ſcribblers who have ſported with the characters of Britiſh ſoldiers.

The army, on their march towards the Ghauts, is next accuſed by Lieutenant

Sheen,

Sheen,* of having had feveral fkirmifhes with Hyder's poligars †. In one of thefe, at a breaft-work, " we put, fays he, three " hundred of them to the bayonet."—By this fhameful, cruel, and daftardly method of fighting, it feems, Mr. Sheen's feelings, as a man, were fhockingly hurt.—Would to God the good Lieutenant was as remarkable for his veracity, as for his tendernefs ! if he was, we fhould have to lament the fate of every object lying at the mercy of the Britifh troops in the campaign alluded to, becaufe all indifcriminately muft have excited his fympathy and compaffion.

Lieutenant Sheen, however, feems pretty well reconciled to the idea of ftabbing

* From the illiberal reflections contained in Mr. Sheen's production, one would naturally conclude this gentleman to be a foreign fugitive: but on looking into the Bombay Calendar for 1786, he there appears in the lower rank of enfigns on that eftablifhment.

† The death of Hyder Ali Khân happened about the 9th of November, 1782; when his fon and fucceffor, Tippoo Sultan, became our future enemy, and promifes to be almoft as formidable a one as his father was; having hitherto held the reins of government with a fteady hand. He is doubtlefs poffeffed of eminent abilities; but he is neither fo great and politic a ftatefman, nor fo brave and fkilful a general; nor is he upon the whole fo great a prince as Hyder.

the reputation of a ſoldier, and of a gentleman, whoſe honour muſt be dearer to him than life. But the act of ſtabbing a Mahommedan Tartar with a bayonet, who holds a ſcymetar or dagger to your boſom, is, with him, a conſcientious Chriſtian veteran, big with the moſt ſavage and unheard of barbarity.

Three hundred, however, put to the bayonet, is another of thoſe errors in calculation, for which Mr. Sheen ſeems pretty famous. But the truth is, there were only in the ſum total one hundred and ſeventy. And now on this occaſion I wiſh to ask, where the inhumanity could be againſt a numerous enemy, even if the number exceeded three hundred, that, which he himſelf imagined? Did we act contrary to the rules of war?—We fought with avowed enemies, who by taking the field, armed with their weapons, and in every reſpect prepared equally for offence and defence, had a fair and equal chance againſt us, their antagoniſts. Or is not this alſo the practice of modern war amongſt civilized nations?

That

That Mr. Sheen's character ſhould not want any requiſite to make it compleat, he ſeems anxious to convince us, that he is not leſs remarkable for his wonderful expertneſs at fabricating, than for his vanity and preſumption. A ſpecimen of this appears from what was incidental to the juſt recited affair of the bayonet buſineſs. "This "execution, he ſays, ſo terrified thoſe "irregulars, that we met with no further "oppoſition till we arrived at the Ghauts*, "a paſs about eight feet wide, and three "miles long, and the ſame ſtrongly forti"fied." Hereupon Mr. Sheen obſerves in a ſort of aſtoniſhment, "that luckily, as it "happened, General Mathews knew no"thing of this defile, otherwiſe it would "have been madneſs in him to have at"tempted it; for if the enemy had made

* This vaſt chain of mountains extends along the coaſt of Malabar, at unequal diſtances from the ſea, and in an almoſt uninterrupted direction nearly as far to the ſouthward as Cape Comorin. The entrance into the Myſore and Bidnure diſtricts from the weſtern ſide of the Peninſula, is rendered extremely difficult and hazardous, by ſteep and narrow paſſes over theſe mountains, commonly called *Ghauts*, and therefore the croſſing them with an army requires the plan of military operations to be conducted on a liberal ſcale, as well in point of ſafety as public utility.

" any tolerable defence, it was impreg-" nable."

Whatever opinion the public may have formed of the general character of the commander in chief, I fancy no man will presume to call in queſtion his military ſkill. The animadverſions therefore on it of Lieutenant Sheen, whoſe judgment had not been ripened either by time or experience, muſt be conſidered as the very height of preſumption.

But with it, infamous as it will appear, I muſt beg leave to mention another paſſage in Dodſley's Annual Regiſter for the above ſpecified year, page 92, which is equally abſurd with the foregoing, and probably, without examination or doubt of its fallacy, borrowed from it. " A fortunate " ignorance, it ſays, of the difficulty and " danger of forcing a paſſage through the " Ghauts, ſeemed to be the only apology " that could be made for the attempt, at " leaſt for the manner of conducting it, " and the ſucceſs ſeemed to juſtify the " raſhneſs of the undertaking. The only " account we have of this tranſaction, is

" from

"from an officer, who was one of the "party engaged in the attack." The Regiſter's compiler muſt ſurely have had this valuable piece of intelligence from Sheen's pamphlet, and not the identical perſon of the officer. Suppoſing, however, it was from the puiſſant officer himſelf, what a pity it is, ſo diligent and faithful an hiſtorian ſhould at the ſame time forget to acquaint him, that he had then the honour to carry the Engliſh colours there as well as at Onore!

Does it appear credible to the intelligent and diſcerning part of mankind, that the General could be ignorant of the Ghauts, or that paſs through which he muſt unavoidably lead his army before he could reach the city of Bidnure? Did he not in a letter to the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, dated from Cundapore, the 29th of January, 1783, repreſent to them, in the moſt forcible language, the great danger and difficulty, if not impracticability, of the enterprize, together with the fatal conſequences likely to attend a failure? The ſtate and condition of his army, he alſo aſſured them, was not ſuch as might warrant an attempt upon Bidnure:

ftill, notwithftanding, as he conceived it to be their defire, he was refolved to make the tryal, in which he fhould proceed with firmnefs, regardlefs of the danger and the hazard to which he was expofed from the inferiority of his ftrength, and fome other particulars rather to his difadvantage. Having thus formed his opinion with the utmoft propriety, in confequence of the information which he had then obtained, of the natural ftrength and fituation of the Ghauts, and the number of the enemy, who were ready to oppofe his operations, it might therefore feem in the General, an intrepidity of foul, that fees and encounters all dangers and dificulties; and a fpirit of determinate valour acting by rule, and equally diftant from rafhnefs and timidity.

In a noble attempt we fall nobly,—but the General with his brave army, fucceeded beyond expectation, owing to their ardour for acting in conformity to the inftructions and exprefs orders of their fuperiors, though at the fame time they had been fully fenfible of the extreme hazard of the enterprize. How then fhould the General be deemed rafh and headftrong? The

aſſertion appears to me ſo extremely paradoxical, as never to be ſatisfactorily cleared up; ſo that if any meaning, unleſs he confeſſes himſelf miſ-informed, can be deduced from his tale, few or none will be inclined to think well of Lieutenant Sheen's ideas of veracity, concerning matters as they really exiſted and of courſe of Lieutenant Sheen himſelf, in the merit of his military rank, if Lieutenant Sheen is either very likely to continue Lieutenant Sheen, in *ſtatu quo erat priùs*, or to poſſeſs no military rank at all.

Mr. Sheen then proceeds to acquaint us, " That arrived at the ſecond barrier, we " were alarmed at the prodigious number, " and ſtrong poſition of the enemy, but " finding it likewiſe as dangerous to re- " treat as to advance, we charged home on " all quarters, 'till the motley crew gave " way and fled, leaving about five hundred " men killed and wounded." To this he adds, " That our ſmall body, fluſhed with " ſucceſs, then proceeded to immediate ex- " ecution with the bayonet, yet never " halted a moment 'till they had gained " the ſummit of the Ghauts, and all the

" way under a heavy cannonading from
" the enemy."

We have in this account, (which by the bye I have endeavoured to mend a little,) a charming aſſemblage of beautiful metaphors, and ſpecimen of happy diction, peculiar only to the Lieutenant. What can be more admirable than the figurative expreſſion of *charging home* in all quarters, unleſs it be exceeded by the illuſtration of
" our ſmall body being fluſhed with ſuc-
" ceſs, immediately proceeded to effectual
" buſineſs with the bayonet."

It is a truth, well known to every one on that ſervice, that the loſs of the enemy at the aſſault of the Ghauts, did not exceed one hundred and twenty men killed and wounded; and it is equally certain, that the Engliſh troops, which attacked the paſs, were much more conſiderable in number than Mr. Sheen repreſents them to be: yet on the occaſion our loſs was very inconſiderable, being not more than thirty men killed and wounded.

After the ſurrender of Bidnure, the capital of the province, we are farther told by Lieutenant Sheen, "That though the "Rajah took care to ſecure his own private property, he nevertheleſs put General Mathews into poſſeſſion of thirty "lacks of pagodas, with a conſiderable "quantity of diamonds and other precious "ſtones, part of which (he adds,) himſelf "had ſeen, and which afterwards the General had ſecreted for himſelf, and ſent "under his brother's ſafeguard to Bombay." It ſtands likewiſe aſſerted in Dodſley's Annual Regiſter, of 1783, page 101, that an officer,* ſuppoſed to be Secretary to the General, who had free acceſs to the rooms of the place, where the treaſure was depoſited, and who was even appointed to take an inventory of parts of it, deſcribes it as immenſe; and beſides heaps of unvalued riches, ſuch as jewels, maſſy gold, and ſilver furniture, eſtimates the whole at forty-eight lacks of pagodas.— A great part of the treaſure, the ſame ſecretary was heard to ſay, belonged to the

* Mr. William Henry Cowan, of the Bombay Civil Eſtabliſhment.

officers;

officers; at leaſt, there were ſome commotions and heart-burnings about it; but the General kept it ſecure a long time, and what at laſt became of it, no intelligence could be had; ſo that if juſtice was done the officers, the dividend to a ſubaltern might amount to about three thouſand pounds ſterling.

It reſts undoubtedly a matter of great difficulty, to aſcertain the exact amount of the treaſure found in the opulent city of Bidnure, and as great to reconcile the various and contradictory accounts, which have been given of it by different gentlemen employed in the ſame ſervice; ſome of them having affirmed they had ocular proof of what they related, though their relations in the main were not conſiſtent with one another.—For my part, I believe the truth to be, that none of theſe accounts are well authenticated by facts, as evidently appears by the oppoſite teſtimony of Hyat Saheb, the Jemautdar (or Governor of the Province,) who certainly ought to have known beſt the ſtate of the treaſure. He aſſures us, that it amounted to twenty-four lacks of pagodas, excluſive of a quantity of jewels

els and other valuable effects, which were alſo conſiderable. We are next informed by Lieutenant Sheen, that "Unfortunately "for the General, his brother ſoon after "fell into the hands of the Nabob, who "ſtruck off his head; and thus it came to "paſs, that the army remained ſtill un- "informed how this treaſure was diſpoſed "of, and whether it ever arrived at Bom- "bay. By his calculation, it was a loſs of "above 25,000 rupees to each ſubaltern, a "quantum making about 3125l. ſterling."

Though the exceptionable and erroneous parts of Mr. Sheen's narrative have been hitherto animadverted upon with freedom, I notwithſtanding may here acquieſce in what he ſays; and this is a proof, that in my attempt to refute the ſeveral charges brought againſt the army, I have been acting from no other impulſe than that of ſtrict juſtice and impartiality. Thus far, I am afraid, the charge is true. Wherever, therefore, I ſhall find reaſon to join him in opinion, I will readily acknowledge the ſame, but muſt beg leave to queſtion his fair dealing, and contradict him when ſenſible he is wrong in his aſſertions.

It

It is a fact, which cannot be doubted, but that a very considerable portion of the treasure found in Bidnure, was sequestered by the General for his own use, and afterwards transmitted to Goa or Bombay, in a vessel of his own. But though this circumstance was generally known to the whole army, no enquiry, to clear up the certainty of its being so, took place: nor was the amount of what was said to have been sent by the General to the abovementioned places, ever exactly ascertained, conjectures varying thereon, notwithstanding it was thought from unquestionable authority, that this amount could not be less than 150,000l. sterling.

It equally deserves notice, that a considerable part of the captured property in the campaign of 1783, by the forces on the coast of Malabar, and intrusted with Agents, came to no better account: for at the close of the war, the army were, and are to this very hour, totally ignorant of what became of it. For notwithstanding the most earnest and repeated solicitations of the officers, who were deputed and remained in the country near three years after this war, for

the final adjuſtment of the claims of his Majeſty's troops, which had ſerved on that ſide of India, the juſt mentioned agents refuſed payment, under the vague pretence of not being authorized to pay any prize money, but to ſuch claimants, who ſhould perſonally appear at the Preſidency of Bombay.

But to return to the army, in which I was engaged, the diſtreſſed ſituation of its greater part, ſhortly after the ſignal epoch of the ſurrender of Bidnure, on account of their long arrears of pay, due from the Company, and the very inadequate ſhare of the treaſure, which was aſſigned them, were circumſtances that could not make them much affected to the General; and if we here to add the meaſures concerted by him to conceal the exact eſtimate of the ſpoils, and evidently with the view of wronging the army, it would be no wonder if this diſaffection had generated extreme diſguſt.

It appears, however, that notwithſtanding the prejudices formed againſt the General, the public ſervice was in no wiſe hurt by them. The principal officers of his Majeſty's

Majeſty's forces, though they ſeverely felt the indignity the General had put upon them, and were determined to do themſelves, as well as thoſe under their command juſtice, yet they never failed to pay an implicit obedience to his orders and directions. In ſhort, the army had every reaſon to complain of the General's conduct, and it is with regret I ſay, that I cannot throw a veil over its deformity: but as it is a maxim in our laws, that every man is ſuppoſed innocent till he is fairly and juridically convicted of guilt, let us for a moment ſuſpend our judgmnt on him, and advert only to the diſaſters of his fate after the ſurrender of Bidnure, together with the arbitrary proceeding of the Government of Bombay, which diveſted him of his command without exhibiting a ſingle charge againſt him: whence, if we cannot in our hearts entirely acquit, we may, at leaſt, find an inclination to pity him.

The diſaſtrous circumſtances, which afterwards the army were involved in, and which ſeem to have weighed down the General, were not even ſo much as ſuſpected,

pected, or not in the leaſt dreaded at the time of his ſuſpenſion, though he was himſelf very ſenſible of his hazardous ſituation. We find that he made ſeveral applications to the Government of Bombay for a reinforcement, repreſenting its abſolute neceſſity; but they were deaf to his ſolicitations. He alſo applied to that of Madras; but alas, too late! For the enemy were coming upon him with a very formidable army, and he, with leſs than two thouſand brave men, met with from them that diſcomfiture, which he muſt have expected.

It is matter of great regret to the candid part of mankind, that the commander in chief, in that expedition, did not ſurvive, that he might have come before the public, at leaſt with an explanation of his conduct, if not with a full anſwer to the accuſations of his enemies. As the deſtruction of the principal part of his army in Bidnure, and afterwards the rigorous treatment of the ſurvivors, when they firſt became known in England, were circumſtances that deeply intereſted the public. I ſhall, therefore, in order to elucidate

your further enquiry, relative to that fatal event, as well as for the ſake of common juſtice to the fame of an unfortunate individual, who has not been enabled to tell his own ſtory, I refer you to the accompanying letters* written by the general to Lord Macartney, and Sir Eyre Coote, a ſhort time previous to the recapture of Bidnure.

In my next, you ſhall hear from me of this and other adventures: but in the *interim*, be aſſured that I remain,

With the utmoſt attachment
and reſpect,

Sir,

Your's, &c.

* Annexed to the end of this work.

LETTER III.

Calcutta, December, 1786.

SIR,

Ecce iterum Crispinus! Lo! Lieutenant Sheen again makes his entrance on the ſtage: he is a principal actor, and muſt be called upon to play his part, in the different ſcenes of the army's further operations.

" The ſecond day, ſays he, after our ar-
" rival at Bidnure, the Rajah informed
" General Mathews of a fort called Annant-
" pore, that was under his command, and
" gave him an order to the Killadhaur, or
" governor, to ſurrender it to him on his
" arrival. This fort was about thirty miles
" diſtant. The general accordingly diſ-
" patched Captain M'Culloch with the fif-
" teenth batallion of ſepoys, to march and
" take poſſeſſion of the place."—So far Mr.

Sheen,

Sheen,—but upon ſecond thought, as this affair is reputed ſomething intereſting, I ſhall endeavour, from the beginning, to purſue it in its due length.

On the 1ſt of February, 1783, the fifteenth battalion of Bombay ſepoys, commanded by Captain William M'Culloch, with a few artillery men, two field pieces, and a howitzer, marched from Bidnure, and advanced that day as far as the village of Fattah-Pettah, on the Seringapatnam road, where they encamped, and remained two days. They then proceeded by ſlow marches to Annantpore, a ſmall town and fort, ſituated about twenty-four miles eaſt of Bidnure, where they arrived on the 5th, and ſummoned the garriſon, hoping by a timely ſurrender of the place, that the effuſion of blood would be prevented, which a fruitleſs and obſtinate defence muſt neceſſarily occaſion. But, to the great ſurprize of Captain M'Culloch, the garriſon, inſtead of returning a favourable anſwer, imprudently added inſult, by detaining a Subahdaur and an orderly Havildar, who carried the flag of truce. After this, another ſummons

mons was ſent off, but with as little ſucceſs as the firſt, the bearers of it being in like manner detained, and no anſwer ſent back. The Engliſh troops remained in the town till the evening following. They had no heavy artillery to reduce the place by force, and being withal apprehenſive of a ſuperior number of the enemy coming to its relief, it was judged adviſable, for the preſent, to poſtpone the enterprize, and on their retreat towards Bidnure, to require a ſufficient force.

The Fort of Annantpore being a place of conſiderable importance to Tippoo, chiefly on account of its being ſituated on the Seringapatnam road, it may not be amiſs here to deſcribe it, if for no other reaſon, than becauſe it appears to have been little known to Europeans.

The Fort cannot be prized for an advantageous poſition, having the Pettah, or open town at a ſmall diſtance ſouth of it, and built upon much higher ground. The ditch, is broad and deep, but contains no water, except during the rainy ſeaſon.

 The

The glacis is naturally ſo high as to cover part of the curtain, and it would be difficult for an enemy to gain therein a lodgment, without previous regular approaches. But how unfavourable ſoever it may be in this reſpect, batteries cannot only be erected at the pettah, but muſketry, placed under cover of the walls of the houſes, may direct their fire on thoſe, placed to work the guns on the ramparts.

It has three cavalier towers, two of which, when it fell into our poſſeſſion, were found occupied by a ſort of cannon of enormous ſize, and their fabric exceeding clumſy. This particular ſpecies of ordnance is commonly framed of ſeveral pieces of iron fitted together longitudinally, and begirt with iron-rings. The natives imagined them to be a convenient machinery for diſcharging ſtone bullets of a prodigious magnitude, and indeed when fired, they yield a report like thunder *. Their uſe, but probably rather

* When Mahomet II. beſieged Conſtantinople in 1453, he battered the walls with ſtone-bullets, and ſome of his pieces were of the calibre of 1200lb. but then they could not be fired oftner than four times a day.—See Guicciardini Hiſt. à d'Italia, lib. i. page 24, 4to. edit. Ven. 1562.

in the nature of the Roman *Catapult*, appears to be of conſiderable antiquity in different parts of the world. But ſince the invention of gunpowder, the extreme difficulty of pointing and managing ſuch vaſt and unweildy pieces, which can only be fired in a particular direction, makes them of little ſervice, and in fact they ſeldom do much execution.—The deſcribed fort, however, notwithſtanding all its diſadvantages, ſtands higher in the opinion of the natives, than any other in that part of Hindooſtan.

But to return to Captain M'Culloch, whom we left on his retreat, to make a report of the diſappointment he had met with; General Mathews having conſidered the matter, and the nature of the ſervice, detached to join him Major Campbell, who, on the 6th of February, marched from Bidnure, and that day advanced as far as the village of Fattah-Pettah, and the next morning left that place with the following reinforcement, viz. of the ſecond batallion of the forty-ſecond, with ſmall detachments from the ninty-eighth, hundredth, and hundred and ſecond regiments of his

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Majesty's troops, amounting in the whole to upwards of six hundred Europeans, and the second grenadier and fifteenth batallions of Bombay sepoys, with four battering cannon, two field-pieces, and a howitzer.

Having reached Annantpore on the 9th, the following letter of instructions from Brigadier General Mathews, was then received by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell.

SIR,

"I am glad you have marched, "because the battalion, which is now on "its route back from Annantpore, will "have your assistance. Doolies should have "been sent you by the Commissary. Mus-"kets,—ammunition, &c. you have enough "for the present purpose; nevertheless, for "fear of emergencies more will be sent, "nor will provisions be forgotten.

"I hope you will not fail to give strict "orders against plundering, or destroying "the camp-cattle; for Captain Alston has "given directions for some of the bullocks

"to

" to be killed, which were appointed for " carrying provisions for your detachment.

" Artillery will be sent to-morrow, and " I hope you will keep the communication " free, for the security of your march. " The guides were delivered to Colonel " M'Leod, who I suppose are with you. " Two others now attend you.

" The enemy, so I understood by the " deserters, are at Summogah, to the " amount of seven hundred horse, and " about one thousand two hundred sepoys, " besides four thousand peons, and you " have a sufficient detachment to beat " them;—and if they will not deliver up " Annantpore, you have also sufficient ar- " tillery to force them.

" The enemy, being connected, there " will be no occasion to advance Captain " M'Culloch's battalion as ordered; but " on securing Annantpore with a proper " garrison, you may march your party " to beat up their camp.

" Wiſhing you to be tender of the pro-
" perty of the inhabitants, I would avoid
" taking their cattle: but in caſe you can-
" not be otherwiſe ſupplied, I would have
" you ſend a regular party, not to ſhoot
" the cattle, but to drive them to your
" camp for your regular ſupplies. The
" country about Annantpore and Sum-
" mogah abounds with cattle, and from
" thence the city of Bidnure muſt alſo be
" ſerved.

" I encloſe you an order, which you
" will be pleaſed to publiſh and make
" known to the army, and to all the fol-
" lowers of the camp.

" Some Bazar people, who were to ac-
" company, but are now afraid to join you,
" being apprehenſive they may be either
" preſſed, or their bullocks killed, I ſhall
" take upon me to quiet their fears, and ſo
" perſuade them to proceed with you.

" Pleaſe to caution your men againſt
" ſtraggling from the camp, or entering far

" in-

" into the woods; for the enemy will very
" probably lie in wait to deſtroy them.

Wiſhing you ſucceſs,

I am, Sir,

your moſt obedient Servant,

RICH. MATHEWS."

FATTAH-PETTAH,
February 8*th*, 1783.

Without delay, after the communication of theſe inſtructions* to the other acting officers,

* Previous alſo to the attack on the place, there were orders of the ſame date and place, from the General to the troops, which were publickly read to them, and are as follows:

To all Officers and others, under the command of Brigadier-General Mathews:

" You are hereby ſtrictly forbid to moleſt the Bazar people, " or the inhabitants of the country in any manner, or on " any pretence whatſoever, either by preſſing them to carry " burdens, or by taking from them their cattle; or in ſhort " by depriving them of their liberty, or property in any " ſhape, as you ſhall anſwer the diſobedience of theſe orders " to me.

(Signed)

RICHARD MATHEWS."

And

officers, and army in general, a battery was constructed with the utmost celerity; and, being finished by day-break, was opened on the morning of the 15th, against the fort, and with such effectual success, that in a few hours the breach appeared practicable, and preparations were made for a general assault.

I must here stop for a moment to premise, that I am now come to that crisis, on which rests the most material charge brought against the army, by Lieutenant Sheen, or more properly by a certain set of restless and evil-minded men, who act behind the curtain; and who probably made use of this young Officer, as a tool for accomplishing their base and mischievous purposes.

And these orders were further enforced on the 11th of February, 1783, by Major Campbell at Annantpore, as may appear by the following notice:

Major Campbell hopes that the above orders will be strictly attended to; and likewise that the repeated orders against plundering, will be implicitly obeyed, as no excuse whatever will justify such an unsoldier-like practice. He therefore is determined to punish, with the utmost severity, the first offender; and at the same time assures the troops, that they will be furnished with provisions as regularly as circumstances can allow.

"When

"When a practicable breach," Mr. Sheen says, "was effected, orders were issued for "storming and giving no quarter, which 'was immediately executed; and every "man was put to the sword, *except one* "*horseman*, who made his escape, after "being wounded in three different parts."

To this bold and daring assertion, I shall give the most peremptory denial; and in order to enforce the right, I may be supposed to have to that privilege, I shall here copy with the utmost fidelity, the proceedings of the troops, who were employed in that service, from a Journal of the scene of action; and do appeal for its accuracy, and my veracity, to those gentlemen who were present, and whose rank in all respects is superior to that of Mr. Sheen, of course intitles them to an equal, if not better claim to the public confidence.

The storming party was commanded by Captain Dalyell, of the forty-second, and consisted of the Flank companies of that and the hundreth Regiment. The besieged made little resistance, and, in their panic,

fled with the utmoſt precipitation into the inner gateway. Our troops immediately ruſhing forwards with bayonets fixed in purſuit of them, forced open the wicket of the gate, and gained entrance; whilſt others, aſcending the Breach, eſcaladed the walls in different places. A conſiderable ſlaughter ſoon enſued among thoſe of the enemy, who had the temerity to oppoſe the ſuperior valour of the aſſailants. It muſt, however, be obſerved, that the officers uſed every precaution in their power to prevent any acts of cruelty; but it is very well known, eſpecially to military men, how dificult it is to reſtrain the impetuoſity of troops at their firſt onſet, and particularly when they happen to be compoſed of men, who differed as much in ſentiments and language, as in dreſs and complexion. Nevertheleſs, it is evident the Engliſh troops behaved on the occaſion with becoming ſpirit, diſdaining to take any cruel advantage of the enemy's conſternation, and conſequently diſorder, in their defeat.

The garriſon of Annantpore before the ſiege, as well, according to the information

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of the enemy themſelves, as from our own obſervations, conſiſted of about four hundred men, and the number of thoſe who fell in the aſſault, were about two hundred and twenty. The priſoners amounted to one hundred and eighty, among whom many were wounded; and theſe were received into our own hoſpitals, where they experienced the ſame care and attention we are wont to give our own countrymen, and in their convaleſcent ſtate they were releaſed as the reſt were.

From the ſlender reſiſtance made by the garriſon in the aſſault, the loſs of the Engliſh was inconſiderable. I ſhould have remarked, that ſuch of the enemy as were made priſoners, had been exchanged for the four perſons, who carried our flags of truce to the fort. It appeared after taking of it, that theſe men had been put in irons, and ſent to Summogah, another Fort, upwards of thirty miles diſtant from Annantpore. At firſt, it was reported by the enemy, that they had been taken by them in a *ſortie*, but this falſehood refuted, their exchange was brought about by the humane diſ-

disposition of Captain M' Culloch, who gave a sum of money to the man, who informed him of their situation, and this was the person, who had chiefly assisted him in negociating their exchange.

But if we give credit to Mr. Sheen, this could not have been the real state of affairs, on the reduction of Annantpore. He boldly assures us, " that a most shocking spectacle " then presented itself to the astonished eye; " *upwards of four hundred beautiful women,* " *stabbed with the bayonet, expired, or were* " *expiring within each others arms,* whilst " the private soldiers continued revelling " in all manner of excess, having first " outrageously defiled their bodies and " next plundered them of all their jewels." He does not, positively, say that the officers countenanced them in these acts of barbarity; but faintly expresses himself, that they were not able to restrain them, as if tacitly they approved what was done.

It must be a fine army indeed! where there is no subordination, no respect for command, and where the private soldier

can dare to tell his officer, he will obey only when it may be convenient to him. But why do nations enact mutiny laws, and think it rational to enforce them with rigour? In vain they do it, if every soldier was of the disposition of those, so preposterously represented by Mr. Sheen. Still, you will say, that such palpable calumny, and wilful misrepresentation of facts, might admit of some degree of extenuation, as coming from so contemptible a person, as the author of so wicked an aspersion, whose credit, it is to be hoped, can never mislead any reader. The historian, I make no doubt, will never rely on such information, especially if circumspect in weighing the merit of his authorities. If otherwise disposed, he may, indeed, in the spirit of a party writer, propagate error for truth, and obtrude upon his readers a store of fanciful inventions, which the ignorant and malevolent are always ready to circulate. Add to this, that the mischief increases, and few may refute the mistakes they are led into, when they read of transactions and events in very distant regions. We may labour also under no small difficulty to learn the true state of

those occurrences, which daily pass round us; as it may happen, that the more intimately we are concerned in any transaction, the more absurdly we may find it discussed by mere conjectural knowledge in the public accounts of it. In the preceding case, as matters have been represented in England, the Public were taught to regard the fate of General Mathews, and the unfortunate gentlemen, who were taken prisoners with him at Bidnure, rather as malefactors, condemned by the wrath of heaven, than as men, who gloriously suffered in the cause of their country. But can any believe it? Is it probable? or, has it been the practice of the British nation in Hindoostan, cruelly to massacre innocent women and children? From my own knowledge of the officers employed on the service, I am clear that they were incapable of assenting to such an act.

That some few women and children of Annantpore were unfortunately killed during the severe cannonade, or in the assault of the place, is a circumstance not to be denied. It was absolutely unavoidable in such a situation: but that they were rudely

to the bayonet, from the baſe motive of plundering or defiling them, is entirely without foundation. From the teſtimony of ſeveral gentlemen, reſpectable for candour and integrity, who were on that ſervice, it may be depended on that no more than ſix women and children were unfortunately killed, owing to their having been expoſed to our fire promiſcuouſly with the garriſon: And ſo far from any kind of violence having been offered to the perſons of the women, on the night after the capture of the place, a houſe was allotted for their reception, and a guard of our Sepoys was ordered for their protection. The next morning, they were conducted by an eſcort beyond the limits of the fort, with permiſſion to proceed from Annantpore whereever they pleaſed.

Lieutenant Sheen further ſays, "I had "almoſt forgot to mention, that ſome of "the women, rather than be torn from "their relations, threw themſelves into "large tanks, where they were drowned." While credulity prevails, there will always be abundance of falſhoods propagated by

 artful

artful and defigning men; and there is nothing fo improbable as will not be believed by fome. But I am not here obliged to rely on the information of others, as I can, from my own knowledge and obfervation relate facts, which, I truft, muft fpeak to the common fenfe of mankind, and refute every fyllable that has been publifhed by Mr. Sheen, relative to the tranfactions of the army at Annantpore.

Lieutenant Sheen alfo adds: "That the "troops were afterwards feverely repri-"manded for their licentious behaviour." This too I pronounce to be equally falfe and groundlefs; for, fo far from having been reprimanded for licentioufnefs, the army received the thanks* of their commander, for

* *Extract from the general orders, iffued by Major Campbell, at Annantpore, February 16th 1783.*

"MAJOR CAMPBELL returns his thanks to the army, for "their fpirited conduct, yefterday; and particularly his "acknowledgements to Captain Dalyell, and the Officers and "non-commiffioned Officers and Privates of the Flank "companies of the forty-fecond Regiment, who headed the "ftorm; but ftrongly recommends in future, when the Bay-"onet muft be made ufe of, that a fhot fhould never be "fired."

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for their ſpirited exertions and good conduct during the attack. The fabricator of calumnies, ſo eaſily refuted, is more an object of pity than of reſentment, unleſs we ſuppoſe that his aſſertions are not ſo much the reſult of ignorance as of a malignant and perverſe diſpoſition. When a charge, ſo ſerious and deliberate, is inſinuated againſt a body of men, many of whom were of high rank and character, ſurely ſome more plauſible reaſons ſhould be aſſigned than the mere *ipſe dixit* of Lieutenant Sheen. Such dreams of aſſaſſination, muſt therefore be conſidered as the illuſion of a diſordered brain, or he muſt be held forth to public infamy for having gratified the predominant malignancy of his mind, in wilfully taking occaſion to calumniate and vilify his commander in chief; and if ſo, I cannot help reminding him, that he is amenable to the

The ſtricteſt orders were alſo at the ſame time given for preventing diſturbances of any ſort; and accordingly the greateſt attention was paid by the officers to keep the ſoldiers from moleſting any of the inhabitants, as any found ſo offending, were to be inſtantly puniſhed.

the martial law, for the different parts of his conduct, which are come to our knowledge, and which have been either ſlightly mentioned or expoſed, in the foregoing pages. For when a perſon, to whatever deſcription of men he may belong, whether civil, eccleſiaſtical or military, ſets himſelf above the laws, and thoſe regulations which enjoin a due ſubordination, he ought to be diſcountenanced by the whole community. —And has not the author of this malicious defamation, done every thing in his power to annihilate that confidence, which ought to be placed in the commander in chief of an army, by expoſing him, and every officer and ſoldier under him, to public contempt and hatred? has he not repreſented them as tyrants; and in ſome reſpects, more cruelly oppreſſive than the inſtruments of Turkiſh deſpotiſm? has he not accuſed them of having violated the law of nations, forgotten their duty, tarniſhed their honour, and proſtituted their conſciences like venal wretches fully diſpoſed to oppreſs the defenceleſs inhabitants of a country? and not only to oppreſs, but, for

the baſeſt lucre, to imbrue their hands in the blood of innocent women and children.

It is a known and univerſal rule of war, amongſt civilized nations, that places taken by ſtorm, and without any capitulation, are expoſed to all the miſeries, which the conquerors may chooſe to inflict.

Annantpore was in this horrid ſituation; conſequently the lives of the inhabitants, with every thing belonging to them, were entirely at the mercy of the Engliſh troops. But chriſtianity, humanity, the dignity of the Britiſh nation, and their own feelings as men, induced them not to exert the right of conqueſt in its utmoſt rigour; though two of their Flags of truce ſent into the fort at different times, had been detained, the bearers put in irons, and caſt into a dungeon, contrary to the laws of war.

I do not here pretend to define what is generally underſtood by the laws of war. Civilized nations ought not to adopt the laws or cuſtoms of other countries, which are yet in a ſtate of barbarity. It will there-

fore, be ſufficient to obſerve, that there are nations who conſider themſelves as authorized by their own laws, or rather caprices, to put to death every individual belonging to the enemy, who may fall into their hands, without regard to age or ſex.

But without further obſervation on this matter, we may conclude the conduct of a General to be cruel, when the miſchief done to the enemy, exceed in a conſiderable degree, the advantages to be derived from them.

Of the many characteriſtics which diſtinguiſh a civilized ſtate of ſociety, the moſt endearing is that of humanity, diſplayed by nations at war with each other, in the treatment of their captives. To public virtue may be added, the private feelings of the heart, ever melting into compaſſion at ſight of another's woe; men, who ſo feel, may be called citizens of the world! becauſe each fellow-creature in diſtreſs, becomes the object of their pity and regard. Their ſentiments, therefore, muſt not only be grounded on the principles of morality,

but may likewiſe derive additional force from maxims of policy and prudential motives, as amid the various and uncertain revolutions of human affairs, we may contemplate the misfortunes of others, with the eye of pity to-day, and to-morrow, perhaps, being placed in the ſame ſituation ourſelves, may look for a return of the conſolation we have given.

In every line and rank of life, that affection of the mind which we denominate ſympathy, ought to be cheriſhed; but by no claſs of men more than thoſe who follow the profeſſion of arms. The ſcenes in which ſoldiers are often unavoidably engaged, tend to deaden, if not wholly to eradicate the ſentiments of pity and remorſe. There are, however, ſome diſpoſitions ſo tender and humane, as to reſiſt the ill effects of the cruel ſpectacles which ſoldiers are ſometimes obliged to witneſs. *Sertorius*, *Brutus*, *Titus*, and many other heroes of antiquity, though they ſpent the greater part of their lives in camps, ſeem never to have loſt ſight of their naturul humanity. But, doubtleſs, diſpoſitions naturally cruel are rendered more callous, by ſcenes of blood. *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Domi-*

 tian,

tian, and many others amongſt the anticnts became, by habit, wholly inſenſible to ſufferings of their fellow-creatures.

The ferocity of theſe latter, and otherlike ſcourgers of the human-race, increaſed to ſuch a degree, that they ſeemed to have been no leſs delighted with acts of cruelty, than the former with thoſe of benevolence. *Hannibal* was naturally cruel; and the ſuperiority of *Scipio*'s character over that of the Carthaginian, was owing more to his benevolence and humanity, than to his extraordinary ſucceſs in arms.

I have been led into theſe reflections by the cruel and inſidious treatment which ſo many diſtinguiſhed characters experienced, who unfortunately fell into the hands of that diſgrace of the human form, Tippoo Sultan. He, among other moderns of the ſame character, may be ſaid to be a living example of Eaſtern barbarity. Even his father, the implacable Hyder Ali Khân, has been exceeded by him in acts of the moſt unparalelled cruelty; his ſavage manners

ners yielding only to the baſeneſs and malignity of his heart.

But humanity, as well as political conſiderations forbid our attempting to retaliate his unexampled perfidy and cruelty. We were, therefore, obliged to reſt contented with the more lenient mode of verbal remonſtrance to effect the releaſe of thoſe gentlemen, whom he detained againſt the laws of war, and the dictates of humanity.

Theſe conſiderations, I truſt, were properly repreſented to him, and urged with that peculiar ſpirit and energy which the nature of the caſe ſo ſtrongly required. All we have to lament is, that his hardened ſoul reſiſted their influence; and on that account it is that I wiſh to exhibit him as truly infamous and deteſtable.

In conjunction with him, our indignation ſhould riſe againſt the ſhameful conduct of the French Governor of Cuddalore, and of M. Suffrein. Not all the reputation for activity, perſeverance and valour, which the latter acquired in India, will ſkreen this

part

part of his conduct from deteſtation. Contrary to the inſtinct of humanity, the ſpirit of Chriſtianity, and the honour of a ſoldier, he gave up to his infidel ally the Britiſh priſoners, whom the fortune of war had put in his power; when, acquainted as he was with the diſpoſition of Tippoo, he muſt have known that he was ſending them to miſery or death. What can wipe away the ſtain of ſo infamous a tranſaction? Who that hears the ſtory of thoſe unhappy men, can refrain from imprecating vengeance on all who were inſtrumental to their ſufferings? As well on Suffrein and Tippoo, as on thoſe among ourſelves, who having had it in their power to relieve them, left them to their fate without ſuccour or protection.

But let us for a moment turn our eyes from ſo diſagreeable a picture, and comfort ourſelves with the pleaſing retroſpect of the genuine Britiſh character, in which every worthy and generous ſentiment, ſprings up and flouriſhes, as in its native ſoil. — Agreeable to your requeſt in my next, I promiſe myſelf the pleaſure of being able to furniſh you with a ſuccinct

account of the moſt remarkable events that happened in the late ſiege of Mangulore, and 'till then, with the utmoſt attachment and reſpect,

I remain, &c.

LET-

LETTER IV.

Calcutta, February 20, 1787.

SIR,

ACCORDING to my promiſe, I have here delineated for your inſpection, a ſketch of thoſe important military operations on the weſtern ſide of India, which ſucceeded the recapture of Bidnure, by Tippo Sultan, and I wiſh, for your ſake, it had been a finiſhed picture, but then it would have exceeded the limits of thoſe ideas I commenced with. However, as I elucidate all the tranſactions of the ſiege of Mangulore, you will have enough, for ſuch information as you deſire to communicate to others. The reiterated proofs of friendſhip with which you have honoured me, encourage me further to hope, that though at times you muſt experience pain, you will feel that pain palliated by pleaſing reflections on thoſe re-

mark-

markable occurrences wherein Great Britain has been ſo eſſentially intereſted in this part of Hindooſtan.

Mangulore, otherwiſe called *Corial Bunder*, is ſituated in about 13°. 01′ north latitude, and 72°. 00′. eaſt longitude from London. It is about one hundred miles diſtant from Seringapatam, the capital of Tippoo Sultan's dominions. As lying within the tropics, it may be imagined, that it experiences all the inconveniencies of ſultry heat, uſual in thoſe latitudes; but the refreſhing ſea-breeze, which daily cools the air, renders it not only ſalubrious, but exceedingly pleaſant and agreeable to European conſtitutions. The port is commodious, and ſufficiently extenſive to contain any number of veſſels; the only defect is, that there is not a ſufficient depth of water for large ſhips on the bar. Notwithſtanding this diſadvantage, there cannot be a better ſituation for trade, being nearly the central part of the coaſt of Malabar;— for by commanding, as it does, the greater part of the commerce of the Bidnure and Myſore provinces, it will

always

always continue to be a place of the utmoſt importance.

When the country was governed by the Kings of Canara, it was the moſt charming, fertile, and opulent of any in Aſia. The whole coaſt is copiouſly watered by a number of rivers, flowing from ſources in the Ghaut-Mountains, and emptying themſelves into the ſea. It is likewiſe an almoſt inexhauſtible granary for rice, with which it ſupplies the coaſts of Arabia and Perſia. The trade, however, carried on from Mangulore has been much on the decline, ſince the country ſubmitted to the yoke of Hyder Ali Khân.

The fortreſs of Mangulore, is ſituated on an eminence, oppoſite the entrance of the river, and this appears to be the ſpot where the Portugueze Factory formerly ſtood. Hyder, deſirous of conſtructing a citadel for the defence of the harbour and city, employed for that purpoſe, in the year 1774, M. Catini, a French engineer in his ſervice. The ſituation, nevertheleſs, was ill choſen, and the ſtructure, which is according to the Eaſtern manner of fortification, appears

appears by experience to have been extremely injudicious, and but ill calculated to withſtand the force of heavy artillery, and the European method of carrying on approaches.

During the war of 1768, between the Engliſh and Hyder, an army was ſent from Bombay, to attack his poſſeſſions on that ſide of India. The reſiſtance they met with being weak, Mangulore was eaſily reduced. Intelligence of the loſs reaching Hyder, who was at that time with his grand army in the Carnatic, he inſtantly diſpatched his ſon Tippoo Saheb with a conſiderable force to recover the place. Tippoo having with great art concealed his route, he moved along with incredible rapidity towards the coaſt of Malabar, and arrived in a ſhort time at his place of deſtination. His ſudden and unexpected appearance communicated ſuch diſorder and panic among the Engliſh troops, that though encamped on a very favourable ſituation for defence, the ground being high, particularly in front, and commanding an exten-

ſive view of the adjacent country, they notwithſtanding abandoned their poſt, and flying with the utmoſt precipitation, were purſued to the gates of Mangulore, by the enemy's cavalry, who entered the place pell mell, with the fugitives.

This attack was executed with ſo much diligence and addreſs by Tippoo, and produced ſuch great diſorder among the Engliſh troops, that very few had time to make their eſcape on board the ſhips; and their ſhameful flight added to the ardor of the enemy, who immediately embarked and captured three veſſels before they were able to clear the harbour. In this manner the whole of the Engliſh army were made priſoners, conſiſting of the Commander in chief, forty ſix officers, about ſix hundred Europeans, and near five thouſand native troops, together with the artillery and baggage.

It was not till after the ſurrender of Bidnure in the beginning of 1783, that the Engliſh became again repoſſeſſed of Mangulore. The expedition under Brigadier

General Mathews, was ſo brilliant and ſo ſucceſsful at this period, and ſo rapid the progreſs of the Engliſh arms on that ſide of India, that it aſtoniſhed and terrified their enemies. For beſides the province of Bidnure, a conqueſt was made of almoſt the whole of the low country, to the weſtward of the Ghauts, extending from Carwar to near Cochin, in leſs than ſix weeks; the fortreſs of Mangulore, and ſome other places on the ſea-coaſt excepted, which held out till the months of March and April following.

On the 31ſt of January 1783, a detachment of the army marched from Bidnure againſt Mangulore, with an order from Hyat Saheb, late Jemautdar of the province, to the Killahdaur of that fortreſs, deſiring him to ſurrender it to the Engliſh army. This detachment having reached that place on the 6th of February, the garriſon was ſummoned, but the governor refuſed complying with the order, and prepared to ſtand on his defence. The Engliſh not venturing to proceed to an immediate attack, encamped about three miles from the

the fort, till they were joined by a reinforcement, with the battering cannon from Cundapore. On their approach to the fort, they met with confiderable oppofition from the enemy, who fprung feveral mines by which we loft upwards of feventy men: but notwithftanding the inferiority of our force, the enemy were driven from their out-pofts and batteries, and obliged to retire within the fort,

The operations, however, went on but flowly, or were rather fufpended, till the 21ft, when General Mathews arrived from Bidnure, with a confiderable reinforcement of Europeans and Sepoys. And the Killahdaur fhewing an intention to ftand a fiege, the place was compleatly invefted. On the 8th of March, a battery of five eighteen pounders was opened on the fouth, with a mortar battery on the north fide, the former at about one hundred and fifty yards diftance from the rampart. About fix o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy being apprehenfive that the breach was practicable, and that our troops would attempt to carry the place by affault at night, Ruf-

tum Ali Beg, the Killahdaur, ſent a flag of truce to the General, with propoſals for ſurrendering on terms of capitulation: which being agreed to, it was ſtipulated that the private property of every denomination ſhould be ſecured to the enemy, with permiſſion to depart wherever they thought proper.

The fort was accordingly ſurrendered the next morning, and at this, and other ſea-ports of Tippoo Sultan's dominions on the coaſt of Malabar, twelve ſhips of war,* of from 64 to 36 guns, moſt of which were on the ſtocks, and their hulls nearly finiſhed, under the direction of European artificers: with

* Docks may be conſtructed on different parts of this coaſt, ſufficient not only for repairing, but building ſhips of the line. To theſe it is eaſy to bring excellent timber from the interior parts of the country, ſo that whatever relates to building or repairing may be done as perfectly in as England. The *Teke Tree*, called by *Fryer*, the Indian oak, grows in moſt of theſe parts; and is eſteemed better for its durability in water, than the Engliſh oak. Ships built of that wood, and uſed in the country trade, laſt thirty or forty years, and ſome have been known to laſt much longer.

with thirty other veſſels of inferior force, and about one hundred Gallivats, and armed boats of different denominations, together with immenſe quantities of naval ſtores, and other valuable articles fell into the hands of the captors.

On the 7th of April following, Deckal or Deckuli, a ſtrong fort ſituated on the ſea-coaſt, to the ſouthward of Mangulore, was taken by ſtorm after a vigorous reſiſtance, and the greater part of the garriſon fell in the aſſault. The loſs of the Engliſh was very inconſiderable, being only four European privates killed, one officer, one ſerjeant, and ſeven privates wounded.

General Mathews returned to Bidnure immediately after adjuſting the capitulation of Mangulore. And about this time intelligence was received from the coaſt of Coromandel, that Tippoo Sultan had ſent the greater part of his army out of the Carnatic through the Changama-paſs ; and it was expected that he himſelf would ſoon follow, and uſe his utmoſt endeavours to recover his valuable poſſeſſions in the Bidnure coun-

try. At this time the English army was dispersed in so many different detachments, that the General found himself unequal to an enemy of force, either in the field, or in any of his quarters. All his brilliant victories were, therefore, far from being either solid or decisive; and seemed merely calculated to dazzle, or deceive those who were remote from the scene of action.

The intelligence of Tippoo's approach, proved exactly true, for on the 6th of April, the vanguard of his army appeared before Bidnure; and the place being soon after closely invested, after a siege of seventeen days, proposals were made by the General for a surrender by capitulation. Nothing could have been more acceptable to Tippoo, than this proposition. It accorded with all his views, and being complied with, the garrison marched out of the fort with the honors of war, on the 28th of April, and piled their arms on the glacis. The articles particularly specified, that the General, when joined by the garrisons of Annantpore and Cowladroog, was to be at

full

full liberty to march unmolested, with all private property from Bidnure to Goa, by way of *Sedashagur*, and thence to embark for Bombay. But these conditions, were not attended to, the garrison were escorted by a strong body of the enemy to a tank, about the distance of half a mile from the city gate, where that brave but unfortunate body of men were surrounded by the enemy's horse and foot, sentinels being posted on every side, beyond whom no person had permission to pass. The regulars afterwards proceeded to disarm, and force them to become prisoners at discretion. It was in vain to expostulate on so base a violation of the most solemn treaty, contrary to the adopted rules of war. The garrison being disarmed were sent into the interior parts of the country, linked two and two, and confined in separate strong forts loaded with fetters. Who, possessing humanity or a love of justice, can withold the tear of sympathy, to the memory of those brave men, sacrificed in the service of their country, and claiming all the grateful remembrance, and honourable testimony, which the living can pay to departed worth?

About the latter end of April, the Nabob sent a detachment of his army amounting to about 4000 men horse and foot, who descended the Ghauts, under the command of Hussain Ali Khân, and encamped within four miles of Mangulore. Towards midnight on the 6th of May, Colonel Campbell with about 1400 regular troops, determined to suprize their camp, and having reached them about day break, after an irregular fire which continued for a few minutes, they gave way and fled with precipitation, leaving behind them four six pounders, field artillery, with the travelling carriages compleat, and 180 draught-bullocks. Their loss in killed and wounded is uncertain, but supposed to have been inconsiderable. That of the English, was two European privates killed, one Captain, and one subaltern, with one private wounded.

This defeat, however, accelerated Tippoo's march. Having put the garrison of Bidnure in order, and settled the affairs of the country, and flushed with the inglorious victory he had gained over General Mathews, he assembled the Mysore army,

army, and with the aid of his allies, the French, he directed his further operations towards the coaſt of Malabar, determined to reduce the other garriſons and poſts which ſtill remained in poſſeſſion of the Engliſh, on that ſide of the peninſula.

Having met with no material oppoſition on his march, the vanguard of his army reached the heights of Cuddrie, within four miles of Mangulore on the 19th of May. The day following, by intelligence receiv-ed from deſerters, the main body of his army was found to amount to upwards of one hundred and thirty thouſand fighting men, ſix hundred of whom were French European infantry, under the command of Colonel Coſſigny, together with a troop of French diſmounted cavalry, and a corps conſiſting partly of natives, and Europeans of different nations, under the command of Col. Lally,* and Monſ. Boodena a Captain in the French ſervice.

*Col. Lally, is ſaid to be a native of Rumilly, a town of Savoy. In the war before the laſt, he left his native country in queſt of better fortune, and entered in the ſervice of the French

ſervice. Tippoo had beſides with him a conſiderable field train of artillery, and about one hundred and twenty pieces of battering

French Eaſt India Company, in which he firſt became a ſerjeant. By his activity and induſtry, he ſoon acquired a ſmall competency towards his future ſupport in life; but at the cloſe of that war, the ſhip in which he was returning to Europe, being taken by the Engliſh, he loſt both his liberty and the fruits of his induſtry. On the return of peace, he was exchanged, and from London he again paſſed over to India. Sometime after, chagrined by the treatment he had formerly received, he quitted the ſervice of the Company, and entered himſelf in a military party called the Swiſs, who hired their ſervices to the Indian Princes. By his military talents and bravery he ſoon diſtinguiſhed himſelf from his comrades; and in the year 1775, whilſt in the ſervice of the Nabob of Adoni, he was honoured by the King of France with the title of Major by brevet. Afterwards he commanded a corps of 4000 men, and received a ſecond mark of favour from his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, who ſent him a brevet commiſſion of Colonel of infantry, with the Croſs of St. Louis.

The Engliſh knowing the attachment of Colonel Lally to the French, and being perſuaded that he was active in undermining their intereſt with the Nabob of Adoni, intrigued ſo ſucceſsfully with that Prince, that he was obliged to quit his ſervice, but in a very honourable manner. He then went with his corps to Nizam Ali, Nabob of the Decan, and brother to the Nabob of Adoni. The Engliſh purſued him ſtill at this court, and at laſt he offered his ſervice to Hyder Ali, whoſe eſteem and confidence he ſoon gained, by his gallant manner of behaviour at the head of his corps, which conſiſted chiefly of Europeans.

battering cannon of different calibers. The whole of this formidable force being arrived, they occupied all the heights within three and four miles diſtance of the garriſon of Mangulore. A river lay on the right and left, and their encampment extended about four or five miles in a ſemicircular direction.

The chief command of the Engliſh forces on the coaſt of Malabar, was at this critical conjuncture proviſionally conferred by the Preſident and Select Committee of Bombay, on Colonel Campbell. As it happened, he was extremely unfortunate reſpecting intelligence concerning this rapid movement, and unexpected approach of the enemy: for notwithſtanding the fulleſt information had been obtained from the inhabitants of the country, as well as from deſerters, of the ſurrender of Bidnure, and the captive ſtate of General Mathews and his army, it was hardly believed at Mangulore, till the place was compleatly inveſted. There was another affair of the utmoſt conſequence, which deſerves to be equally lamented, that no attention had been paid

to the means of procuring a proper ſupply of proviſions and other neceſſaries, both for the ſecurity of the garriſon, and againſt the Monſoon, which was juſt then ſetting in; beſides which no care had been taken to repair the defects of the fortifications. In ſhort the wants in every department, were ſo ſhamefully guarded againſt, that the future proſpect of the troops, now became truly alarming. It is true, this want of foreſight cannot be ſaid to have originated ſolely with the commander in chief; ſtill he might be blamed for confiding too much in the near approach of the heavy rains, and the preſumption he entertained, that the enemy could not think of a ſerious attack at ſo late a ſeaſon of the year, and under ſuch obvious diſadvantages. We may, however, to theſe circumſtances impute the loſs of many brave officers and men. They were too much expoſed to the enemy's fire; and the want of a ſufficient number of houſes, and the ſcarcity of materials for conſtructing ſuitable accommodations for the troops within the walls, were afterwards the cauſe of great ſickneſs and deſertion.

At

At the commencement of the ſiege, the ſtrength of the garriſon conſiſted of about five hundred and forty Europeans, and two thouſand eight hundred and fifty Sepoys.— About this time an incident happened, that had the enemy been poſſeſſed of eminent courage, or military talents, the conſequence muſt inevitably have proved fatal to the Engliſh army, and they would have been rendered incapable of winning thoſe laurels, they afterwards ſo gloriouſly acquired. Two battalions of Sepoys, a few pieces of light artillery, with an adequate number of European gunners, were detached under Captain Edward Nugent of the Company's ſervice, to occupy a ſtrong poſition, ſituated about twelve hundred yards eaſtward of the fort. This was a very extenſive hill. When in poſſeſſion of Hyder, a ſlight retrenchment had been thrown up to the ſouthward of it; and every other part except to the weſtward, was almoſt inacceſſible. It commanded the two principal roads leading to the town and fortreſs of Mangulore; and on that account only it appeared eligible to keep poſſeſſion of it. But though from natural and acquired ad-

vantages, it might be deemed of equal utility and importance, there were weighty motives for judging it extremely hazardous, at this critical juncture, to retain possession of a post so far distant from the garrison, and of such great extent, that the whole of our force was not adequate to its defence. Besides it was not furnished with a single magazine of ammunition or provisions, nor did it afford any water; and in case of an attack, its distance from the garrison was such, as rendered it impossible for them to afford it the least relief or protection; and consequently the enemy had it in their power to cut off the whole detachment. But although their different movements evidently indicated a sudden attack in that quarter, and clearly pointed out the necessity of withdrawing the troops: yet, Colonel Campbell, contrary to the general voice of his officers, and at the risk of the loss of his whole army, founded his hopes of defence, on the confidence he had in the natural strength of the place.

According to what was expected, at day break on the 23d of May, the enemy open-

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ed a battery of four guns upon this out-poſt, from that part of their encampment which lay neareſt on one of the oppoſite hills. Immediatelyafter ſeveral large columns of their troops advanced to a briſk attack, which continued about twenty minutes, under an inceſſant fire of cannon, muſketry, and rockets: and ſuch was the great ſuperiority of the enemy over our troops, that the latter were forced to abandon their ſtation, and retreat precipitately towards the fort. Before their deſperate ſituation was perfectly known, the 42d regiment, and a corps of Sepoys, were ordered out to ſupport them; but this reinforcement was not able to reach the hill till its defenders had been driven from it in great diſorder. The detachment, however, having joined them, on their retreat, the ſpirited exertions of the officers, by animating the troops, conſiderably retarded the progreſs of the enemy, and enabled a number of the fugitives to eſcape. The behaviour of our Europeans on this occaſion, was by no means ſuch as might have been expected from troops, who had hitherto been particularly diſtinguiſhed for their intrepid conduct, and contempt of danger.

The

The enemy, thus encouraged by their ſucceſs, had the temerity to advance within musket ſhot of the covert-way. But as ſoon as the artillery of the garriſon, which was directed upon them with the utmoſt preciſion, began to take effect, they quickly withdrew to a reſpectful diſtance. The loſs of the Engliſh on this occaſion, was one European officer killed, one wounded, and three miſſing, with upwards of two hundred and fifty Sepoys killed, wounded, and made priſoners. Immediately after this unfortunate buſineſs, all our other poſts, except the Caſk-battery, were evacuated, and the whole of the troops withdrawn under cover of the cannon of the garriſon.

It is not ſurpriſing, that after hazarding ſo diſagreeable an event, the Commander in Chief ſhould endeavour to throw the blame from himſelf. The compaſs of what was originally intended to be written on this ſubject, will not permit us to examine into a multiplicity of particulars. Still it is but juſtice to the character of Captain Nugent to remark, that his bravery and prudent conduct were equally conſpicuous

on this as on every occaſion, during the courſe of the ſiege; in which it was evidently apparent, that he was poſſeſſed of the greateſt profeſſional ſkill, as well as the moſt perfect courage; and from aſſiduous attention to his duty, joined to a real knowledge of the ſervice, and conſtant care and preciſion in the diſcharge of his ſubordinate ſtation, it may be truly affirmed, that he was not only intitled to every degree of praiſe, but had alſo the moſt indiſputable claim to promotion.

The enemy having proved thus far ſucceſsful in diſlodging our out-poſt, it was expected with ſome confidence, as already mentioned, that the approaching Monſoon would oblige them to ſuſpend their operations till the return of the fair ſeaſon. In this caſe, our little army muſt have been perfectly quiet during the continuance of the rains. The proximity of Tellicherry made it eaſy, on the change of the ſeaſon, to tranſmit thence, as well as from Bombay, ſuch ſupplies and reinforcements as might enable the garriſon to take the field. Theſe were our hopes; but the enemy, to

make the moſt of their advantages over our weak ſtate, comparatively to their own, did not remain inactive. The approach of the rainy ſeaſon rather added to their ardour. The garriſon was ſummoned to ſurrender. The trenches were opened, and batteries erected, well ſupplied with European gunners; and they began their operations by puſhing on the ſiege with vigour, under a determination of carrying on approaches, at the ſame time, both to the north and ſouth of the fort.

The 4th of June they opened their batteries, under the powerful fire of twelve twenty-four pounders, and ſome of a ſmaller calibre. Soon after there was an addition of ſeven braſs mortars, from which, inſtead of ſhells, they kept up an inceſſant fire, each night from ſun-ſet to ſun-riſe, throwing large ſtones into the fort and works, ſome of which were upwards of ſeventy pounds weight. The damage and execution done by them, were in general conſiderable, and greatly annoyed the garriſon. This circumſtance likewiſe enabled the enemy to proceed in their approaches, during the night, with the greater ſecurity,

and

and with little loſs, although at times they met with ſome interruption from our ſhells.

It has already been obſerved *en paſſant*, that the fortifications of the place, through want of the neceſſary repairs, were far from being in a reſpectable condition; but the deficiency of ſtrength was amply ſupplied by the gallantry of the garriſon, who, entirely cut off as they were, from every hope of ſuccour, nevertheleſs perſevered with great bravery and reſolution, during the whole of the rainy ſeaſon, in a determined and noble defence. The officers and men, when off their tour of duty, were conſtantly employed in conſtructing various works for the defence of the place; and all ranks, with the utmoſt alacrity, participated in the labour. Captain *Sartorius*, the chief engineer, with active zeal and diligent aſſiduity, pointed out the neceſſity of ſuch exertions, in a manner that did him the higheſt honour. This worthy officer, poſſeſſing the moſt conſummate profeſſional ſkill, was cool in danger, decided in diſtreſs, and ever ready and judicious in his expedients. Such is the character of this gentleman, which

makes him as deservedly conspicuous in his profession, as it is honourable to the individual, and important to the public.

The artillery of the besiegers, however, assisted by the military science of the French auxiliaries, soon gained an evident superiority, and they were indefatigable in carrying on their operations; but the alertness and obstinate defence of the garrison rendered caution an object of necessity; and together with the violent rains which then frequently fell, could not fail of considerably retarding their approaches. Notwithstanding these impediments, matters were so far advanced, about the beginning of July, as to render an attack on the body of the place practicable. But although the fortifications were reduced to a heap of ruins, yet the enemy was repulsed in every attempt to carry the place by assault.

On the 2d of August notification being made by M. Piveron de Morlae, a French Envoy with Tippoo Sultan, of the preliminary articles of peace being signed at Versailles on the 20th of January, 1783, by the

Plenipoten-

Plenipotentiaries of their Britannic and Moſt Chriſtian Majeſties; in compliance therewith, a ceſſation of hoſtilities was propoſed by the Envoy, and agreed to by the Nabob, and by Colonel Campbell, in behalf of the Eaſt India Company's poſſeſſions on the coaſt of Malabar. The conditions in general, on which it was concluded, were, that all things, both within and without the garriſon of Mangulore, ſhould remain in the ſame ſituation in which they were then in, for a time particularly ſpecified; and that hoſtages ſhould be exchanged for the mutual performance of that ſtipulation. The French auxiliaries were therefore obliged to withdraw; but the Nabob perſiſting in the inveſtment of Mangulore, converted the ſiege into a blockade, and the garriſon were reduced to the greateſt diſtreſs through the want of proviſions; and it was evident, though peace was then in agitation, that he was reſolved to ſtarve them into a ſurrender.

The Commander in Chief, on this melancholy occaſion, uſed his utmoſt endeavours for re-animating his troops with a

ſpirit of perſeverance; and, for that purpoſe, he iſſued repeated aſſurances in general orders, that ſpeedy relief was expected from Bombay. In this ſtate, nevertheleſs, they remained near four months longer, depreſſed by fatigue, and emaciated with famine. Their patience was almoſt exhauſted by diſappointments, and no proſpect of relief from any quarter appearing to conſole them, was the cauſe of ſickneſs, and deſertion prevailing in a manner the moſt alarming.

On the morning of the 24th of November, two fleets appeared, one from the northward, and the other from the ſouthward; both ſtood towards the place, and early in the afternoon, the ſhips of war took their ſtations, ſo as to cover, in the moſt effectual manner, the diſembarkation of the troops. From this fleet was expected the relief and ſuccours, ſo long wiſhed for, and nothing could equal the pleaſure and ſpirit which elated the garriſon: joy and confidence was diffuſed over every countenance, all being perſuaded, that their ſufferings were now come to a termination, and that they ſhould have ample ſatisfaction of thoſe

who had been the caufe of them. And this handful of brave men, whofe noble defence had been feldom equalled, and never furpaffed, prepared with alacrity to fecond the efforts of their countrymen; even the feeble convalefcent, tottering under the weight of his arms, boldly ftepped forward to offer his fervices on this occafion.

The armament which caufed this infpiration, was under the convoy of his Majefty's fhip the Sultan, of 74 guns, Captain Mitchel. About five o'clock in the afternoon, the two fleets, confifting in the whole of about 53 fail of fhips and veffels, anchored oppofite the entrance of the harbour. Brigadier general MacLeod was at the head of the land forces, ftrong in Europeans and native troops, with an adequate train of artillery; and he might have been further fupported by the neighbouring Rajahs, who were eager to repel the tyranny of Tippoo, to whom the greater part of the Malabar coaft no longer owned fubjection.

About ſunſet, the ſignal was made that the troops would land to the ſouthward of the harbour; and ſoon after they were diſcovered in the boats, and every movement promiſed a ſpeedy attack. The garriſon, during the night, lay on their arms, and every neceſſary arrangement took place to facilitate their landing, which was anxiouſly expected. But how great was the diſappointment of the garriſon! for in the morning no diſpoſition appeared in their ſuppoſed deliverers to give them relief; on the contrary, they ſeemed to have forgotten thoſe whom they came to ſuccour, and were preparing to abandon them to deſtruction. It is impoſſible to expreſs the concern and indignation of the officers and ſoldiers at a treatment ſo cruel and unmerited!

In the mean time, it was agreed upon between Tippoo, General MacLeod, and the Commodore, that the garriſon ſhould have a ſupply of proviſions for a month. Theſe proviſions were accordingly landed, but in quantity they were found ſcarce ſufficient for fifteen days conſumption, and the beef, pork, biſcuit and rice, were unfit for uſe,

bearing

bearing evident marks of proviſions which had been condemned ſome years before, and ſet aſide from the uſe of the King's ſquadron. Even a ſupply of fire wood was entirely neglected, an article, ſo eſſentially neceſſary to every beſieged place, and of which but very little remained in the fort. Nor was there a ſupply of medicines or other neceſſaries, though the hoſpitals were crowded with the ſick and wounded, and the whole of the troops in a weakly ſtate—It was thus, thoſe humane commanders, who had been entruſted with the diſcharge of this important duty, exerted themſelves in relieving the garriſon

The ſhips of war continued manœuvering off the harbour till the 1ſt of December. It was evident that the ſudden and unexpected appearance of that fleet, before Mangulore, had occaſioned the greateſt confuſion and panic among the enemy; for they were ſeen withdrawing their heavy artillery from the lines, and a number of their troops filed off to a diſtance. If the Engliſh had taken advantage of this favourable opportunity, with that vivacity which circumſtances demanded,

manded, the enemy had infallibly been diſperſed, or reduced to the neceſſity of leaving that part of the coaſt. On the contrary, they were allowed ſeven days to recover from their conſternation; and Tippoo knew, that delays, ever favorable to a native, are ever fatal to a ſtranger. This conviction determined him to reaſſemble his forces, and ſeeing thoſe that oppoſed him timid and circumſpect, he formed an excellent diſpoſition for repelling any attempt the Engliſh might make, for the more effectual relief of Mangulore.

The ſame day, the garriſon had the mortification to ſee the fleet with the land forces on board, ſail from the road, and ſtand to the ſouthward for Tellicherry. When they were getting under way, two guns were fired by the garriſon, and a ſignal was diſplayed from the moſt conſpicuous part of the fort, "that they were on bad terms with the Nabob and required immediate ſupport," And ſome time after, "that unleſs ſpeedily ſuccoured they could not hold out any longer."—Theſe ſignals were made in view of the fleet, which, never-

theleſs

thelefs continued its courfe. The fhip which had the General on board, however, returned, anchored in the road, and remained there till the 3d of the fame month ; fignals being again difplayed, and at laft anfwered, when fhe was preparing to ftand after the fleet, "that they fhould be fpeedily fuccoured." This promife proved fruitlefs : of a conduct fo myfterious, time muft be left to develope the fecret. For the garrifon were then, and it feems the public are at this day, totally ignorant of the inftructions under which thofe officers acted. But furely no orders could have reftricted them from fupplying the place, conformably to the tenour of the ceffation of hoftilities, with a fufficiency of wholefome provifions for one month ; abundance of which, at that time, might have been procured from any part of India.—Whatever might have been the original deftination of the army under General Mac Leod, yet it was a matter of public notoriety, even in the Nabob's Durbar, that it was in reality intended for the reduction of Cannanore.

This

This ſettlement formerly belonged to the crown of Portugal; in the year 1505, Francis Almeed obtained leave of the king of that country, to build a fort, which was called St. Angelo; and Lopez Britto, with 150 men, was left Governor of it. This was not only intended to defend them againſt the inſults of the Arabians, but alſo as a bulwark for himſelf and his people againſt the invaſion of their neighbouring enemies.

The Hollanders, on their firſt arrival on this coaſt, having been joined by the natives, who were become weary of the tyranny of the Portugueze, diſpoſſeſſed them of Cannanore, with very little trouble, about the year 1660. The Dutch ſometime afterwards, ſold the fort and territory to Ali Rajah a Mahommedan partizan.

The fortreſs of Cannanore is ſituated on a point of land cloſe to the ſea, and together with its natural and acquired advantages, may be deemed one of the ſtrongeſt and moſt complete belonging to the native powers in that part of India. At a very trifling expence

expence, it might be finiſhed agreeable to the rules of modern fortification, and made a military poſt of the utmoſt conſequence. Hence it appears to be a place of much greater importance than Tellicherry, which is not tenable, if it were inveſted by a regular force.

During the late war between the Engliſh and Hyder Ali, the city of Cannanore became the centre, and indeed the only place of trade, belonging to the natives, on that ſide of India. It was alſo the depoſitory of the moſt valuable effects of rich merchants who frequented that place, on account of the ready market for goods of all ſorts, met with there, from whence they were diſtributed to the inland provinces; and at the ſame time the manufactures and natural productions of the country form a very conſiderable part of its commerce. The trade is chiefly carried on by Maplas, a race of rigid Mahommedan adventurers, who began to eſtabliſh themſelves on this continent, about the beginning of the eighth century, and were Apoſtles as well as merchants. They ſoon became the principal factors of

Arabia, Perſia and Egypt; and were treated with many diſtinguiſhed marks of reſpect by the Zamorin, at that time the moſt powerful prince on the coaſt of Malabar, who, equally with his ſubjects, wiſhed to keep up an intercourſe with thoſe countries. Here they multiplied to a great degree, and as their religion allows of polygamy, they marry in every place where they make any ſtay. This nation forming no alliance with ſtrangers, has preſerved its peculiar manners; but though their religion forbids uſury, they are not ſcrupulous in that reſpect; and they are a treacherous ally, and a cruel and inveterate foe.

About the 11th of November, two of the Company's veſſels proceeding from Carwar to Tellicherry with troops, happened unfortunately to be wrecked in a gale of wind, on the coaſt near Cannanore; and Lieutenants Whildon and Mathews, the latter, brother to the unfortunate General of that name, with 300 ſepoys, were ſeized and delivered up to Tippoo, by Ali Rajah Biby, the Queen of that country. Repeated applications and remonſtrances were in

vain made for their releaſe by the Reſident of Tellicherry; and on refuſal, an intention was declared of taking ſatisfaction, as well for this injury, as for the inimical diſpoſition ſhewn, in many other reſpects, by the government of Cannanore, to the Engliſh. There might be here ſome ground for ſatisfaction, but in general it has been obſervable, that avarice has lately made ſo great a progreſs in this part of the world, that the commander of a military force, need only create an occaſion for plunder; and if the civil government is aſſigned a ſhare of the ſpoil, he thence may be aſſured, that ſo far from apprehending diſagreeable conſequences, his conduct will meet with the higheſt approbation. Such buſineſs is more aptly carried on, when the ſemblance of war may be ſtill ſuppoſed to ſubſiſt; but in times of actual peace, the arts of peculation ſucceed but ſlowly, all being attention to the ſame traffic; whereas the profits by war being of a more rapid acquiſition, become of conſequence more alluring, as being in the end more profitable.

The

The army under General Mac Leod, had no ſooner arrived at Tellicherry, than an expedition was formed, in order to chaſtiſe the Biby of Cannanore. On their approach to this town, the fort was ſummoned to ſurrender, but the Governor ſhewing an intention to ſtand a ſiege, batteries were erected, and after a practicable breach had been effected, it was carried by ſtorm on the 14th of December, after a gallant and deſperate reſiſtance from the garriſon, a number of whom fell in the aſſault. In the attack and reduction of this place, and its dependencies, the loſs of the Engliſh in killed and wounded, amounted to about 100 men.

The troops, on this occaſion, diſtinguiſhed themſelves by every proof of diſcipline and humanity, injuring no perſon they found in the place unarmed, and in the fury of the attack, ſparing many who laid down their arms and ſubmitted.

On the fall of Cannanore, the Rajah Biby or Princeſs, was made priſoner of war, as ſhe was an ally of and dependant on Tip-

poo

poo Sultan, that Prince complained loudly of the conduct of the English General, as an infringement of the truce which had been concluded at Mangulore.

I shall now resume my narrative of the blockade of Mangulore. During the month of January 1784, the sufferings of the garrison daily increased, and evils which till now they had not experienced, presented to their minds the most dismal prospect of approaching destruction. The alternative now left them, was either to perish by famine, or become the victims of an incensed and cruel enemy. They chose the former, as most becoming soldiers and British subjects, and accordingly devised a variety of expedients for protracting their miserable existence: some employed themselves, as often as their duty would permit, in searching for frogs in the wet ditch; and those, whose duty prevented them from obtaining food in that manner, were under the necessity of purchasing it, at a high price, of others. In a short time, the resource of frogs failed. The next was that of killing vultures, crows or any sort of birds, that

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came within muſquet-ſhot. This expedient laſted but for a ſhort time, and thoſe only who were good marks-men, could avail themſelves of it, for the ſagacity of the birds ſoon informed them of their danger, and they avoided coming near the garriſon. To this ſucceeded the moſt miſerable ſcene of diſtreſs, which human nature, perhaps, ever ſuffered. The European privates fed upon dogs, which had devoured the dead bodies of their fellow-ſufferers; and many from eating herbs of a noxious quality, put an end to their ſufferings and their lives.

It is true, that towards the latter part of the blockade, the enemy ſent in ſome articles of proviſion for ſale; but as this ſeldom happened, as the quantity was but ſmall, the quality bad, and the price extravagant, the garriſon could not be ſaid to receive by it any eſſential relief. There was great reaſon, beſides, to imagine that the ſole intention of ſending in this Bazar, was with a view to encourage deſertion, and to gain intelligence of the ſtate of the garriſon. At this time, the number of ſick increaſed

creafed daily, and fome of the moft dangerous difeafes made their appearance, particularly putrid fevers, dyfenteries and the fcurvy. The havock made by the two firft, was incredible. By the fcurvy many of the officers, as well as of the privates, were affected in a high degree; and the wounds of many, which had been healed, broke out afrefh. The fepoys, who had nothing more to fubfift on but a fcanty allowance of bad rice, or blackgram, fuch as is commonly ufed for feeding horfes, were, in confequence of their low diet, affected with blindnefs, and from funfet to funrife, incapable of difcerning objects except by the light of the fire; and the miferable fufferers were generally led by their comrades, from the evening parade, to their huts.

The fufferings of the troops, in the latter part of the blockade, were fo extreme, that it is hardly poffible to conceive a more diftreffing or more horrid fcene of mifery— that a tyrant like Tippoo, fhould be void of humanity—that he fhould delight in cruelty, and laugh at the fufferings of thofe whom he facrificed;—that he fhould invent

tortures for the Englifh prifoners, againft whom he may be faid to have fworn eternal enmity, the world will not be furprized to hear; but that an Englifh garrifon, after exhibiting rare inftances of courage, refolution, and fidelity, fhould be fhamefully abandoned by their own countrymen, may appear incredible! They were not indeed merely abandoned, but treated with contempt, and even refufed common neceffaries to preferve their exiftence. Well might they have exclaimed with the Pfalmift: "*It is not an open enemy that has done us this difhonour, for then could we have borne it, but it was even thou, our companion, our guide, and our familiar friend!*"

As a confequence of encreafing hardfhips, defertion among the troops became more frequent, in the month of January, than it had been at any former period of the fiege. From three to five Europeans, and from fifteen to twenty fepoys deferted daily, and fometimes an entire party went off from fome of the out-pofts, carrying with them their arms and accoutrements.

The

The Europeans afterwards ſeen in the enemy's lines, were known to have declared, that no other motive, but the love of life had induced them to go over to the enemy; that in the garriſon, they ſaw no hopes of relief, and the fate likely to await them, in common with their fellow-ſoldiers, was either to periſh by famine or diſeaſe. Many, however, retained ſufficient reſolution and fidelity, to enable them to ſurmount every kind of hardſhip.

> *And with ſtern patience, ſcorning weak complaint,*
> *Harden their hearts againſt aſſailing want.*
>
> THOMSON.

The 23d of January, ſeemed to preſent the neceſſity of deciding on the future fate of the garriſon. Every kind of proviſion was then nearly exhauſted; upwards of 1000 men lay ſick in the hoſpitals, and there were only about 120 Europeans, with 250 ſepoys, who could be deemed capable of doing duty. A council of war was therefore aſſembled at the head-quarters. It conſiſted of the commander in chief, and all

the captains in garrifon, who fat this and the three following days in deliberation.

It appears that the members were not unanimous on the urgent neceffity of propofing terms of capitulation to the Nabob, although it was obvious, that there was no alternative, and that they muft furrender on fuch terms as he might be pleafed to grant. For admitting that they might receive further fupplies of bad provifions, it could not anfwer any falutary purpofe, by reafon of the diminution of the garrifon from mortality, ficknefs and defertion. It further appeared, from the whole of Tippoo's conduct, that he would liften to no terms of accommodation, until Mangulore was either given up to him, or he fhould be compelled, by force of arms, to relinquifh his purpofe of reducing it.

On the 27th of January, the council of war, however, refolved to propofe terms of capitulation. Colonel Campbell, accompanied by fome of his officers, proceeded with that view to the enemy's camp. When introduced into the Durbar, the Nabob

ſignified to the Colonel, that he was perfectly well acquainted with the real ſituation of the garriſon, and his motives for capitulating, concerning which, he had been four days deliberating with his officers. The moſt urgent he ſpecified, were, the want of proviſions, and deſpair of receiving any further ſupply. He was, therefore, ſenſible they were under the neceſſity of accepting from him, whatever terms he ſhould think proper to grant. The Colonel replied, that the ſtate of the garriſon was nearly as repreſented by his Highneſs, and if the terms he had to propoſe ſhould meet with his Highneſs's approbation, he was ready to ſurrender the place to him. The Nabob without inſiſting on any material alteration in the articles, ſeemed inclined to ratify them, when the Colonel intimated, that a ſupply of proviſions for preſent uſe was neceſſary; which Tippoo was pleaſed to give orders for being ſent early next morning; and accordingly, at the time appointed, a plentiful Bazar was ſent in, with abundance of all kinds of proviſions, which were ſold to the garriſon at a reaſonable rate. In the afternoon, a number of Pattamars,

and other veſſels were collected in the harbour, for the purpoſe of tranſporting the garriſon to Tellicherry.

At ſun riſe, on the 29th, an Eaſt-Indiaman, with one of the Company's grabs, and five ſmall pattamars, appeared in ſight from the ſouthward. About nine o'clock, they anchored in the road, and ſoon after made ſignals for a boat, which were not anſwered by the garriſon. At eleven o'clock, the Colonel, attended as before, by ſome of his officers, went to the Nabob's Durbar, and ſigned the articles of capitulation. And in the afternoon, two officers were diſpatched on board the Indiaman, to acquaint the military officers who came from Tellicherry in that veſſel, that the garriſon had ſurrendered. During this day, upwards of 8000 of the enemy's coolies were employed in embarking the ſtores and baggage of the garriſon. In the evening, orders were iſſued for the troops to hold themſelves in readineſs to embark.

Among theſe particulars, it may not be undeſerving of notice, that before the arti-

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cles of capitulation had received the ſeal and ſignature of the Nabob, he deſired that it might be remembered, and ſignified by an inſtrument in writing, that he had uſed no indirect means to procure the giving up of the fort, the ſole cauſe of which, on the part of the beſieged, was their being totally deſtitute of proviſions. He alſo ſhewed himſelf extremely ſolicitous to know, whether the ſurrender of the place, ſo circumſtanced, might, in any reſpect, be injurious to the character of Colonel Campbell as an officer, and having been aſſured that it could not, he immediately ſigned the capitulation. Suffice it to ſay, that on this occaſion, he gave the moſt ample and honourable teſtimony to the gallantry of this brave garriſon, and that the conditions were ſuitable to the generoſity of thoſe ſentiments. For every requiſition made by the Colonel was liberally complied with, and in a manner which would do honour to the moſt exalted character among European princes. The garriſon was allowed all the honours of war; cannon, arms and ammunition, with public ſtores of every kind, whether belonging to the King, or the Eaſt India Company,

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as well as every article of private property, were ſecured to the owners.

On the 30th, about eleven o'clock in the forenoon, the garriſon completely accoutered, with their arms ſhouldered, two field pieces, lighted matches, colours flying and drums beating, marched out at the ſea-gate, to the river ſide, where they embarked. Tippoo's people, on this occaſion, behaved with the utmoſt civility to our men, and ſhewed a readineſs to afford them every aſſiſtance in their power.—This was not, however, all the reſpect ſhewed them, for when the feeble remains of that unfortunate garriſon appeared without the fort, in view of the troops that had aſſailed them, it excited their aſtoniſhment and admiration, that ſo ſmall a number, ſhould, for ſuch a length of time, have been able to withſtand the efforts of the moſt powerful army ever ſeen in India, commanded by a Prince of ſignal courage, and military talents, and aided by his allies the French, whoſe number alone, was more than equal to the European force of the garriſon.

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On the 31ſt of January, the garriſon was finally evacuated; and thus terminated the ſiege of Mangulore, after the place had been ſhut up eight months and thirteen days. The garriſon, which originally conſiſted of 541 Europeans, and 2850 ſepoys, on the day of ſurrender, was, by various caſualties, reduced to 1235 men; ſo that the total loſs, from the beginning to the end of the ſiege, amounted to 1937, which appears to exceed, by 709, the loſs ſuſtained during the late ſiege of Gibraltar.

Upon the whole, however, it appears doubtful, whether the ignorance of the enemy in the ſcience of attack, or the ſpirit and valour of the beſieged in defence, contributed moſt to the ſecurity of the place. Few examples, are to be found in hiſtory, of greater bravery exerted by a handful of men. Their protection in many places, depended upon nothing more than mud-walls. That the garriſon was ſkilfully defended is evident from this circumſtancee, that the taking of the covert-way by the enemy, was but a ſmall ſtep towards obtaining poſſeſſion of the place. Indeed the raſhneſs and precipi-

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tancy of the befiegers, will often intimidate a weak and ignorant Governor: but when attacks are thus eagerly hurried on againft a place, commanded by a brave and intelligent officer, he may, generally, take fuch an advantage of thefe incautious proceedings, as ought to deter an enemy from venturing to adopt them, who poffeffes the leaft degree of prudence or regard for the lives of his foldiers.

The manner of conducting approaches by the native powers in Hindooftan, againft regular fortifications, efpecially when defended by Europeans, is fo extremely injudicious, that the number of thofe who fall in an affault, is always far fhort of the the multitudes who perifh by unwholefome provifions, the inclemency of the weather, and the frequent fkirmifhes which happen during a long fiege. Delays alfo ever difcourage the befiegers, and give frefh fpirit and confidence to the befieged. To thefe confiderations may be added, the rifk incurred, from flow approaches, of being obliged to raife the fiege; a neceffity to which the Nabob's army before Mangulore muft

have been reduced, if that garriſon had been relieved. This was certainly practicable, either by allowing the army under Colonel Fullarton to advance from Palghautcherry, or if General MacLeod had thought expedient to land his force, which was before the place on the 25th of November. But the government of Madras, who might be ſuppoſed to have had many opportunities of being well acquainted with the diſpoſition and ambition of Tippoo, made no attempt to relieve Mangulore. On the contrary, impolitic as it muſt appear, that government iſſued orders for withdrawing the ſouthern army from Palghautcherry, before the ſmalleſt advances had been made, on the part of the enemy, towards ſettling the preliminaries of peace. Nor was it leſs abſurd and inconſiderate in them, to ſend the gentlemen who had been deputed to conclude a peace in behalf of the Company, into the midſt of a country, under the juriſdiction of a faithleſs tyrant, who, to ſecure the object of his ambition, might not ſcruple to trample on the laws of nations; and in that ſituation, theſe gentlemen re-

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mained, until he had time fully ſufficient to accompliſh his wiſhes.

The defence of Mangulore for ſuch a length of time, may be juſtly conſidered as one of the moſt important events of the late war in India,—for nothing was ever more critical than the ſituation of the Britiſh affairs in Aſia at this period, and few things could have been more fortunate in the preſent juncture, than the great effects which it manifeſtly produced, by obliging Tippoo to withdraw the greater part of his forces from the Carnatic. Had he remained there to co-operate with the French troops under the Marquis de Buſſy, and Monſ. Duchemin, conſidering, the ruinous ſtate of the Company's affairs at that time on the coaſt of Coromandel, there could ſcarcely have been a hope of their poſſeſſions, on that ſide of the peninſula, not falling, almoſt a defenceleſs prey, into the hands of the enemy.

It is, therefore, natural, in a country like this, which had long laboured under the calamities of war, to look back upon the

events

events by which that war was terminated, and to make ſome enquiry after thoſe to whom we are indebted for the return of peace: and this, not with a view of informing ourſelves whether the conditions by which it was obtained, were or were not adequate to our ſituation, but with a grateful remembrance of thoſe, without whoſe ſignal courage and vigorous exertions, we might not have been able to have inſiſted on any conditions whatever.

I have already premiſed, that it is not my intention to ſwell this narrative, by a minute detail of military operations; yet it is with no ſmall reluctance and regret that I muſt, for the preſent, decline a task, which from the various proofs it affords of skilful conduct in the officers, and diſciplined valour in the troops, would ſo pleaſingly gratify my private feelings. But while I am celebrating the many ſtriking advantages derived to the Engliſh nation, from the gallant defence made by the garriſon of Mangulore, it might be deemed unjuſt to paſs unnoticed the able exertions and perſeverance of Colonel John Campbell, who commanded

manded in chief, during the ſiege of that place. But not being prepared to enter into a detail of his ſervices, I ſhall content myſelf with briefly obſerving, that though he poſſeſſed few of the requiſites for conſtituting the character of a Wolf or a Daun, and did not ſeem formed for brilliant actions; he was, nevertheleſs, endued with courage in an eminent degree; and during the ſiege, attended with unwearied aſſiduity to the minutiæ of his important truſt, in which he was well ſupported by the indefatigable vigilance and bravery of his officers and men.

This bright picture, however, was not without its ſhades. He had failings, and theſe chiefly ariſing from the impetuoſity of his temper, which ſometimes carried him lengths not altogether juſtifiable. The high opinion he entertained of his rank and abilities made him often the dupe of intereſted and deſigning men. It appears, indeed, thathe was always inclined to ſerve his friends, but this, in many inſtances, he did at the expence of more deſerv ingcharacters, whom he was, but too often, equally ſolicitous to injure.

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Hence he became ſelfiſh in the higheſt degree, and his reſentment, where once he conceived himſelf offended, was rooted and implacable.

I am far from meaning in theſe remarks to depreciate the merits of Colonel Campbell as an officer; my intention is only to diſcountenance that extravagant eulogy, ſo frequently and ſo blindly beſtowed on imagined worth; and in this I appeal to the teſtimony of thoſe who knew him perſonally and intimately.

It was the ſincere wiſh of thoſe who were ſufferers with him, that he might have ſurvived, not only to vindicate his own conduct in the defence of Mangulore, but alſo to bring forward to public view, thoſe tyrants and their inſtruments, to whoſe pernicious counſels the misfortunes of that garriſon may be juſtly aſcribed. The nation might thereby have had an opportunity of doing juſtice on thoſe who had wantonly injured its honour and its intereſt. It is doubtleſs from ſcreening ſuch delinquents that the greater part of the evils in this quarter of the globe

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have originated, as no check is impofed on the ambition of artful and defigning men.

Although the Britifh character for humanity, has in no part of the world been better fuftained than in India; although there be no State or Prince in that country, who will not acknowledge the juftice of this remark, yet the late war, which was carried on with various fuccefs, and under confiderable difficulties, has been productive of numberlefs calamities to the natives, many of whom have fuffered grievous oppreffions. Large fums have been violently extorted from fome of their Princes by the contending armies, under pretence of defraying the expences of the war: and many of the inhabitants have been obliged to abandon their native country, by the unrelenting hand of European rapacity and oppreffion.

The cultivation and commerce of the country likewife fuftained great detriment. A variety of circumftances has fufficiently demonftrated, that fuch wars, and fuch a mode of conduct as has been adopted refpecting the natives, are totally inconfiftent with

with the interefts of a Commercial company, and repugnant to every principle of found policy. Inftead of being fubfervient to the government at home, the adminiftration in India has ever affected independence, and been actuated by a fpirit of fyftematic difobedience. The views and interefts of private men, not the principles of commerce, or of patriotifm, have been the rules of their conduct. Dominion, power, and wealth, are often acquired by good fortune; but to preferve them is the province of political fagacity. Greater glory, as well as greater advantage, is, therefore, to be acquired by retaining and improving, than by extending conquefts.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

GEORGE, LORD MACARTNEY.

MY LORD,

My laſt was from Mangulore, informing you of its ſurrender, and requeſting that you would give ſuch aſſiſtance to the Honourable Company, as lay in your power.—A large body of horſe and foot, under the command of Mahomed Ally, from the Carnatic, has joined the forces that oppoſe me: and they now amount to fifty thouſand men, with twenty-five pieces of cannon. From the number that I told you I could collect for the field, your Lordſhip will determine whether I can make head againſt the foe, with any probability of ſucceſs.—It ſhall be my endeavour to preſerve what has been gained, and to keep the low country clear of the Nabob's troops.—But it has been out of my power to prevent a

number

number of petty Rajahs ſeizing their ancient inheritance, which was wreſted from them by Hyder; and ſome neighbouring Polygars have made encroachments.

I have not the power of puniſhment, and am under the neceſſity of taking ſlight notice of their irregularities; but to check thoſe upſtarts, it takes me three hundred Europeans, and one thouſand Sepoys, that are wanted to face Mahomed Ally, whoſe army, is now only forty miles from Bidnure.

I have great hopes that ſomething effectual will be done on your ſide, by the active exertions of your ſouthern army towards Cöimbettore; while your grand army is expelling the enemy from the Carnatic, I ſhall be able to keep my footing, until reinforced.

I have the pleaſure of informing your Lordſhip, that all the low country, from Carwar to near Cape Comorin, is under our command, excepting the aforementioned impediments from the Rajahs, which com-

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mence from ten miles ſouth of Mangulore to Cannanore, and the Nabob's troops have poſſeſſion of Decal, and another fort, againſt which I have ſent a battalion of Sepoys.

I think it not unlikely that the French will land ſome troops at Calicut, after the departure of our fleet from the coaſt. Such a meaſure might be productive of the moſt dangerous conſequences, in my preſent divided ſtate.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient

and moſt humble ſervant,

RICHARD MATHEWS.

Cundapore,
March 28th, 1783.

TO SIR EYRE COOTE, K.B.

Lieutenant General, and Commander in Chief.

SIR,

SINCE I did myſelf the honour of informing you of the ſurrender of Mangulore, there has arrived from the Carnatic, a conſiderable body of horſe and foot, under Mahomed Ally, which joined to thoſe that now oppoſe me, amounts to fifty thouſand men, with twenty pieces of cannon. The extent of country to be protected, with the number of garriſons to be ſecured, has entirely broken my force, ſo that I cannot collect a party ſufficient to act offenſively, nor indeed to defend what has been gained without effectual aſſiſtance.

I have repeatedly written to Bombay, for *reinforcements*, but they are deaf to every requiſition of ſuch a nature—ſhould any

unfortunate *change* happen, I can only lament that our endeavours, on this ſide, ſhould in the end prove fatal to the public cauſe.

I am ſorry to be obliged to inform you, that the conduct of ſome of the ſenior officers of his Majeſty's troops,* has been, in the higheſt degree, abuſive and ſcurrilous. Lieutenant Colonels MacLeod and Humberſton, and Major Shaw, went to Bombay to complain; the former at a time, when he was ordered to command a detachment to march againſt the enemy,—and Major Campbell has ſince their abſence, kept up the ball of diſſention.

It will be impoſſible for me to act with theſe gentlemen, and I requeſt that they may be ordered to the coaſt of Coromandel, to ſerve where my Aſiatic mode of proceeding may not give them offence;—theſe diſputes have already injured the ſervice, and will more;—for rather than have theſe gentlemen, I will be deprived of the zeal and valour of their regiments.

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*By the publication of theſe Letters, it is not meant to throw the ſmalleſt degree of reflection, upon the conduct of the King's officers alluded to by General Mathews.

The number of papers that have paſſed, require much time to copy;—but I muſt trouble you with the whole correſpondence that you may judge of the ſpirit, which actuated theſe reſolutioners.

The enemy's collected force is now about forty miles from Bidnure. I have two garriſons between them and this city, and am not, therefore, under any apprehenſions for either; but they can paſs them, and invade the low country, and my divided troops can only be ſpectators of its deſolation.

I have great hopes that the active exertions of the armies under your immediate direction, will drive the foe from the Carnatic, and threaten Seringapatam or Coimbettore, which may enable me to fix myſelf, and by raiſing recruits, be at the opening of the next campaign, in a ſtate fit to ſecond your views with a degree of certainty; but the rainy ſeaſon is the time that the enemy may be expected in theſe parts, and to oppoſe them, I beg that you will let me have as many troops as you can ſpare, of thoſe now expected from Europe.

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I requeſt you will let me know, if you think there is any probability of the French landing troops at Calicut, during the abſence of our fleet from the coaſt of Malabar, for ſhould they join the force now there, it might be attended with fatal conſequences.

This blow might in ſome meaſure be guarded againſt, if your ſouthern army would move into the Cöimbettore country, and they (I mean General Lang,) would be joined by three battalions of Travencores ſepoys.

I have the honor to be, with the greateſt reſpect,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient and moſt humble ſervant,

RICHARD MATHEWS.

Cundapore,
March 28th, 1783.

FINIS.